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ARTICLE
IN PRAISE OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
SEX OFFENSE CASES
James Herbie DiFonzo*
"Rapists Shouldn't Be Able to Run Out the Clock."'
"'[DNA] is very, very reliable if you do two things right: if
you test it right, and if you interpret the results right ....
The problem is that jurors think it's absolute and
infallible.'"2
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INTRODUCTION

Suppose that you have agreed to represent an individual
charged with rape. You learn that the indictment, which was
returned one day before the statute of limitations expired,
identified the perpetrator not by name, but only by his DNA
genetic profile. You are also told that the complaining witness
cannot make any identification in the case, and so the prosecution
will largely be relying on a DNA "match" that the State claims
exists between a sample from the rape kit obtainedfrom the victim
shortly after the incident and a DNA sample procured more
recently from your client. Your client denies even knowing the
complainant, much less committing the rape, but he cannot
account for his whereabouts on the day in question. You look at
the relevant dates on the indictment and wonder how you will
defend against a rape accusation twenty years old.
This hypothetical only appears farfetched. We live in an age
of burgeoning and ever-improving forensic DNA techniques,
leading to prosecutorial and legislative efforts to separate serious
sexual assaults from the average run of criminal cases. Primary
among these efforts are attempts to outflank, extend, or abolish
the relevant statutes of limitations.3 "John Doe" indictments
3.

See Chapman, supra note 1.

20041

IN PRAISE OF STATUTES OFLIMITATIONS

1207

listing a genetic marker in lieu of a name illustrate one method
to extend the time within which a sexual assault case may be
prosecuted.4 Legislative modification or abrogation of the
limitations periods constitutes another.' A wealth of legal and
scientific periodicals has discussed the evidentiary breakthrough
effected by DNA. 6 This documentation dovetails with a smaller,
but still extensive, number of articles detailing creative
legislative and prosecutorial efforts to overcome the ordinary
statutes of limitations problems in prosecuting very old sexual
assault cases.' Most of this literature has focused on the ideal
case, that is, on the astonishing reach of DNA technology, with
its assurance that genetic typing is indelible and thus available
indefinitely.8
But our society's actual experience with forensic DNA
is
analysis has not lived up to the scientific promise. The record
replete with instances and patterns of critical examinations
performed under conditions in crime laboratories that reveal the
effects of budgetary shortages, incompetent management, and
arrant corruption.9 "Revelations of shoddy work and poorly run
facilities have shaken the criminal justice system like never
before, raising doubts about the reputation of labs as unbiased
Evidence
See David Doege, Novel Warrant IDs Suspect Only by DNA Databank
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at
available
1999,
2,
Sept.
SENTINEL,
J.
Used to Charge "John Doe" in Rape, MILWAUKEE
the statute of
before
rapists
identify
to
DNA
of
use
the
(recognizing
21533138
1999 WL
Indicting
limitations ends); Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment, Beyond Fingerprinting:
50 AM. U. L.
Rights,
Statutory
and
Constitutional
Defendants'
Criminal
DNA Threatens
DNA indictments to
REV. 979, 981-83 (2001) (describing how prosecutors have used
defendants).
later-identified
protecting
from
limitations
of
statute
the
prevent
See Chapman, supra note 1.
5.
historical
See, e.g., Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 985-89 (recounting the
6.
McDonald, Juries
Ryan
generally
See
investigations).
criminal
in
DNA
of
developments
AM. J.L. & MED. 345
and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA Chain, 24
longer in serious
no
are
admissibility
its
and
evidence
DNA
that
(observing
(1998)
Ye Be Known, 1
Shall
So
DNA
Thy
By
Witness:
dispute); Douglas M. Smith, Genetic
acceptance within
general
gained
has
evidence
DNA
that
(noting
(1993)
207
L.J.
HEALTH
Sally E. Renskers,
the scientific community and is therefore admissible at criminal trials);
39 EMORY L.J.
Fingerprints",
"DNA
Genetic
of
Implications
Certainty:
by
Trial
Comment,
evidence).
DNA
of
use
increasing
309 (1990) (discussing the
warrants
See generally Bernasconi, supra note 4 (observing the effect that DNA
7.
DNA
Fair
a
Drafting
Note,
Diehl,
W.
have on statute of limitation policies); Jonathan
J. 431
JURIMETRICS
39
Cases,
Assault
Sexual
in
Limitations
of
Statute
the
to
Exception
of limitations
(1999) (commenting on legislative efforts to create an exception to statutes
Panaceafor Old,
A
Warrants:
DNA
Note,
Valdivieso,
Veronica
cases);
assault
in sexual
constitutional
Cold Rape Cases?, 90 GEO. L.J. 1009 (2002) (reviewing practical and
implications of DNA warrants).
the ability
8. See Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 989 & n.60 (revealing that DNA has
conditions").
appropriate
under
maintained
if
years
of
to remain viable "for thousands
the
See Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2 (discussing
9.
on
overreliance
and
personnel
laboratory
of
problems created by insufficient training
DNA as evidence).

1208

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:4

advocates for scientific truth."'0 This description does not apply to
all, or even most, of the cases involving genetic typing. But what
we do know about the conduct in many cases is quite disturbing
and suggests that DNA technology may not, as it is actually
deployed in criminal cases, be as successful at weeding the
innocent from the guilty as the scientific structure of the
technology avows.
This Article explores what happens when spectacular
scientific breakthroughs are administered within a criminal
justice system whose stance of impartiality is often undermined
by sloppy or tainted analysis and testimony as it copes with the
pressure to resolve an enormous backlog of DNA samples. A
hypothetical case involving the problems an attorney might face
in representing a client many years after an accusation of rape
serves as the frame for a discussion of both the serious issues and
suggested reforms. After this Introduction, Part II reconsiders
the policy behind statutes of limitations, both as originally
understood and in light of the forensic breakthroughs utilizing
DNA identification methods. Part III explores the failure of state
and federal laboratories to maintain professional forensic
standards, concluding that in many cases these laboratories
disregard basic recordkeeping and sample-retention protocols.
Part IV suggests restraint in our pell-mell rush to limit and
eliminate limitations periods in the cases most affected by DNA
analysis. In addition, Part IV considers whether rape victims
truly benefit from the possibility of open-ended prosecutions.
Finally, Part IV outlines a limitations proposal designed to take
account of both the promise of the forensic future and the peril in
our current simultaneous overreliance on scientific theory and
underestimation of human failings. As a whole, this. Article is by
no means a how-to manual, but rather a hybrid composition: the
theoretical questions of statutory limitations and the law's
punitive and therapeutic aims meet.their answer in the human,
quotidian problems of DNA case-processing. Ultimately, the
Article evaluates a key piece of a larger human puzzle: how
should the legal system deal with incorruptible evidence in very
fallible hands?

10.
Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work,
Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, § 1, at 1
(reporting on
evidence of problems ranging from negligence to outright deception uncovered
in recent
years at crime labs in at least seventeen states).
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II. ARE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS STILL RELEVANT IN THE AGE
OF DNA?

As you read over the indictment detailing the accusation
againstyour client, you ponder two questions: How can a criminal
case be prosecuted (and defended) twenty years after the crime?
How can the prosecution satisfy the statute of limitations with a
formal charge identifying your client only by a numerical code
purportingto be his genetic marker?
A. Limitations Policy Revisited
The first question is an old conundrum, while the second was
first widely repofted only in 1999.11 Nonetheless, these two issues
are intertwined. Despite an overlapping array of rationales and a
broad spectrum of specific provisions, the principal concern of2
criminal statutes of limitations is accuracy of conviction.
Perhaps the most trenchant summary of the rationale for
criminal limitations periods may be found in the Working Papers
of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws:
The primary reasons for restrictions of time revolve
notions that prompt
around universally accepted
that conviction or
insures
prosecution
and
investigation
product of faded
the
not
and
result,
reliable
a
acquittal is
wrongs ought
ancient
that
evidence;
unavailable
memory or
of
concealment
of
cases
some
in
except
resurrected
not to be
community
that
and
offender;
the
of
identity
or
the offense
security and economy in allocation of enforcement resources
require that most effort be concentrated on recent wrongs.
Under the umbrella of ensuring accuracy, traditional
rationales for blocking the late filing of criminal cases fall into
that
several categories. The first set incorporates the desire
4 deemed
evidence,"
fresh
"reasonably
upon
prosecutions be based
more trustworthy than older evidence possibly corroded by time.
"There is less possibility of an erroneous conviction if prosecution
5
is not delayed too long." Statutes of limitations are "usually
See Doege, supra note 4 (discussing the 1999 arrest warrant issued for "John
11.
Doe," described only by his DNA profile). Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing genetic
marker indictments and warrants).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956).
12.
1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
13.
(footnotes
CRIMINAL LAWS 281 (1970) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM]

omitted).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956).
14.
Id.; see also Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (declaring
15.
that a limitations period "is designed to protect individuals from having to defend
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considered the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale
criminal charges."'6 Time fades memories, witnesses die or
disappear, and documentation is destroyed or irretrievably
misplaced." Evidence rebutting assertions of criminal conduct, as
well as the support mustered by the defendant in mitigation of
punishment, often become casualties of the clock."8 To be sure,
the expiration of a limitations period supplies a "nonexculpatory
defense,"'9 but reducing the possibility of an erroneous conviction
obtained when the defense is handicapped by time's passage
remains at the center of limitations policy.2" As the U.S. Supreme
Court recently reiterated, statutes of limitations evince a policy
judgment born of evidentiary concerns," such as whether "the
passage of time has eroded memories or made witnesses or other
evidence unavailable."22
Promoting diligent prosecution constitutes a second major
legislative rationale.2 3 Some courts emphasize the role that
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
passage of time").
16.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). The Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause also provides protection against delayed prosecution, but only when the
defense can show not only that the time lapse caused it substantial prejudice, but also
that it was a tactical ploy by the prosecutor. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
789-90 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The Sixth
Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause offers the defendant no protection against
preindictment delay. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
17.
Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to
Prosecution,102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1954) [hereinafter A PenetrableBarrier];see also
Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 133
(1955) (noting the consensus of judicial opinions that statutes of limitations "are designed
to protect against stale claims after evidence has been lost, memories have faded and
witnesses have disappeared").
18.
The class of beneficiaries of the limitations policy favoring repose is not limited
to those charged with criminal conduct. Witnesses to wrongdoing who anguish at the
prospect of dealing with the rigors of testifying are also entitled to believe that their lives
will eventually no longer face that disruption. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich,
The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAc. L.J. 453, 462 (1997) (describing
the role of limitations periods in preserving witnesses' "peace of mind").
19.
2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 465 (1984) ("The statute of
limitations is clearly a nonexculpatory defense; it bars conviction of an offender even
though he may be entirely culpable.").
20.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956);
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law] (stating that the "primary consideration" of
limitations statutes "is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant"); Bernasconi, supra
note 4, at 994-95 ("[Sltatutory limitations ultimately preserve a defendant's right to
assemble evidence and prepare a vigorous defense.").
21.
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003).
22.
Id.
23.
See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 ("Such a time limit may also
have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate
suspected criminal activity.").
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limitations periods have in prompting official attention to crime,
suggesting that the legislative purpose aims "to discourage
inefficient or dilatory law enforcement rather than to give
offenders the chance to avoid criminal responsibility for their
conduct."24 Obviously, inducing intelligent use of law enforcement
25
resources also furthers the goal of enhancing accurate outcomes.
Rehabilitative concerns comprise another category of limitations
rationales. A long period during which the defendant has
refrained from additional depredations increases the likelihood of
self-rehabilitation and diminishes the necessity for imposition of
the criminal sanction." Declaring an endpoint to prosecution may
itself further this reconstructive rationale:
The criminal who has avoided prosecution for several years
and who seeks to rehabilitate himself would be encouraged
in this objective by the assurance that whatever progress he
makes will not be shattered by enforcement of some long
7
dormant claim of the state to his freedom.
By the same token, a chronic offender is more easily-and
with greater likelihood of success-prosecuted for more recent
crimes.28 The greater amenability of these later criminal acts to
prosecution may render the "need for protecting society against
the perpetrator of a particular offense ...less compelling as the
years pass."29 This latter rationale allows statutes of limitations
to balance two social interests: "allow[ing] the government
sufficient time to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct,
State v. Swartz, 723 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ohio 2000) (quoting State v. Climaco,
24.
Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., 709 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ohio 1999)); see
also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 18, at 492 (noting that "prompt enforcement results in
greater deterrence of wrongdoing," and arguing that limitations theory furthers this
linkage in three ways: (1) deterrence is enhanced when punishment is meted out "closer
in time to the offense;" (2) delay allows for further depredations from the same offender;
and (3) 'the incremental value of deterrence obtained by the pursuit of old claims is likely
to be minimal," because either the wrongdoer has reformed and need be deterred no
longer or the unrepentant criminal will have afforded the legal system more readily
prosecutable cases to target).
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM, supra note 13, at 288 ("[D]eadlines
25.
have a healthy influence on the dispatch of public business. Knowledge by prosecuting
attorneys and investigators that there is only a specified time within which to act will
lead to responsible decisions in allocating resources.").
26. See A Penetrable Barrier,supra note 17, at 634 (observing that "those persons
who have committed crimes in the distant past and have not repeated their errors are
apparently self-rehabilitated and as a result seem to offer little cause for fear as to their
future conduct").
Id.; see also People v. Zamora, 557 P.2d 75, 81 (Cal. 1976) ("A never-ending
27.
is more detrimental to the functioning of a civilized society than it is
prosecution
of
threat
beneficial.").
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1 at 86 (Tentative Draft No.5, 1956).
28.
Id.
29.
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while shielding the defendant from the burden and jeopardy of
confronting distant offenses.""
Despite the hard-and-fast character of statutes of
limitations, legislative policy usually allows certain equitable
exceptions to the expiration of the limitations period. For
example, statutes commonly turn off the limitations clock when
defendants have, through flight or self-concealment, frustrated
the reasonable efforts of the State to locate them.3' The federal
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3290, declares, "No statute of limitations
shall extend to any person fleeing from justice."' This statute
balances two concerns: (1) avoiding an accused's manipulation of
the limitations period "by intentionally avoiding capture and
prosecution on a pending charge," 3 and (2) extending the
statutory protection to "a person utterly without knowledge that
criminal charges are pending who happens to avoid the
authorities (who may or not be diligent in searching for him)." 4
Tolling the running of the statute in these circumstances reflects
legislative enshrinement of an equitable principle analogous to
the "clean hands" doctrine. 3' An accused who absconds for a
certain length of time in order to frustrate prosecution will not be
able to complain that the State may have an equivalent period of
additional time within which to commence the case.36 Thus, to
take advantage of the tolling effect of this provision, federal
30.
United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Alan
L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial,
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 266 (1995).
If a long time goes by, the expenditure of society's resources in criminal
prosecution-in terms of the costs of the investigation, trial, and (if the burden of
proof at trial is met) punishment-and the costs to the community that follow
from removing a now productive member from its midst are not warranted.
Id. The major objection to this line of thought is that limitations statutes block all
prosecutions after the passage of a specified period of time, without regard to the
individual assessment of any retributive or rehabilitative concerns. See id. at 266-67; see
also 2 ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 202(b), at 465 ("[Tlhe absolute rule embodied in a
statute of limitations will no doubt encompass cases where the retributive impulse has
not subsided and where the statute will frustrate the community's sense of what justice
demands.").
31.
See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 202(d) (establishing grounds upon which the
statute of limitations may be tolled based on the defendant's actions).
32.
18 U.S.C. § 3290 (2000).
33.
United States v. McKinney, 785 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 n.7 (D. Md. 1992).
34.
Id.
35.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1234-37 (describing how the
statute of limitations developed historically based on equitable principles).
36.
See United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The tolling
statute reflects the congressional belief that where the defendant impedes the discovery
and prosecution of his criminal conduct by 'fleeing from justice,' his right to avoid
prosecution for distant offenses is diminished while the government's need for additional
discovery time is strengthened.").
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prosecutors must prove that the accused fled for the purpose of
foiling arrest or prosecution. 7
A similar balancing may be seen in state statutes.
Delaware's is typical, excluding from the limitations calculus
"any time when the accused is fleeing or hiding from justice so
that the accused's identity or whereabouts within or outside the
State cannot be ascertained, despite a diligent search for the
accused." 8 Some states exclude all time during which the accused
9
is absent from the jurisdiction, no matter what the motivation,
but those states rely upon the "clear and unambiguous language
of [the] tolling provision [that] places the citizenry on notice that
the criminal statute of limitations will be tolled when a criminal
suspect 'go[es] out of the state."' Other states further limit the
tolling period for the defendant's absence by setting an ultimate
deadline for prosecution.4
Other equitable considerations inform separate tolling
provisions. Periods of time during which the accused is engaged
See Ross v. United States Marshal, 168 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999); United
37.
States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. FonsecaMachado, 53 F.3d 1242, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 1995); Marshall, 856 F.2d at 897-900; United
States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1982); Donnell v. United States, 229
F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1956); Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294, 295-96 (ist Cir.
1933). The Eighth and D.C. Circuits have held that the mere absence of a defendant from
the prosecution's jurisdiction, regardless of intent, may serve to toll the statute. See In re
Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing King v. United States, 144 F.2d
729, 731 (8th Cir. 1944)); Green v. United States, 188 F.2d 48, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (citing
McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1939)). But the better-reasoned
analysis concludes that flight encompasses intent to avoid detection and that therefore a
specific mens rea must be proven. See United States v. Duff, 931 F. Supp. 1306, 1310-11
(E.D. Va. 1996) (discussing both sets of cases and concluding that those requiring the
government to prove intent to avoid prosecution correctly interpret the statute).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(h)(1) (2001). In Delaware, an intent to avoid
38.
detection or prosecution is essential to establish flight from prosecution. See, e.g., State v.
McKenzie, 174 A.2d 318, 320 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961) (establishing that a defendant whose
absence from the jurisdiction was not with the intent of avoiding prosecution was entitled
to the benefits of the statute of limitations); see also State v. Thomas, 459 N.W.2d 204,
208 (Neb. 1990) (noting that the "fleeing from justice" exception applies to defendants who
secrete themselves within or without the state for the purpose of evading discovery or
punishment).
See, e.g., State v. Lee, 948 P.2d 641, 648 (Kan. 1997) (applying statutory
39.
exclusion from the statute of limitations of all the time during which "the accused is
absent from the state") (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(6)(a) (1995)); State v.
Thompson, 427 N.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (applying statutory limitations
exclusion respecting any time during which the defendant was not "an inhabitant of, or
usually resident within" the jurisdiction) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 628.26(K) (1982)).
State v. Cawley, 799 P.2d 574, 577 (N.M. 1990) (second alteration in original)
40.
(quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-9(A) (Michie 1984)).
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8(3)(A) (West 1964 & Supp. 2003)
41.
(providing for the tolling of the statute of limitations "during any time when the accused
is absent from the State, but in no event shall this provision extend the period of
limitation otherwise applicable by more than 5 years").
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in concealing the crime constitute another exception to the
unfettered running of the statute of limitations.42 Concealment
includes behavior "calculated and designed to prevent discovery
of the crime' 3 and is distinguished from mere nondisclosure. 4
The legal trade-off here prevents the accused from taking
advantage of any efforts to frustrate the State's discovery of the
crime and allows the prosecution access to the full limitations
period. 4' This tolling provision draws the line neatly between
interference and noncooperation,
reflecting the broader
distinction between obstruction of appropriate process and the
right against self-incrimination enshrined in the Fifth
Amendment. Related statutory provisions extend the temporal
reach of prosecutions beyond the ordinary deadline in certain
cases of fiduciary breach, forgery, or similar crimes," as well as
in cases of misconduct by public officials.47 In these cases, the
class approach often times the running of the limitations period
from the discovery of the offense and provides an overall deadline
to the prosecution.4 s
42.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 20, at 1220-24 (describing specific
examples of when the defendant's conduct may suspend or postpone the statute of
limitations).
43.
State v. Watson, 67 P.2d 515, 517 (Kan. 1937).
44.
See State v. Wilkins, 985 P.2d 690, 696 (Kan. 1999) (noting that "silence,
inaction, or nondisclosure does not constitute concealment" and concluding that "there
must be a positive act done by the [defendant] calculated to prevent the discovery [of the
crime]"); see also Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 587 (Ind.Ct. App. 2000) (same). See
generally John P. Dawson, FraudulentConcealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH.
L. REV. 875 (1933).
45. See Kifer, 740 N.E.2d at 587-88 (recognizing "a balance between an individual's
interest in repose and the State's interest in having sufficient time to investigate and
build its case").
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(c) (2001) (extending the limitations
period in cases involving "forgery, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty or actively concealed
theft or misapplication of property by an employee, pledgee, bailee or fiduciary"); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8(5)(A) (West 1964) (providing for prosecution even after
expiration of the limitations period for certain crimes based upon breach of fiduciary
obligation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.74(2)(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003) ("A prosecution for
theft against one who obtained possession of the property lawfully and subsequently
misappropriated it may be commenced within one year after discovery of the loss by the
aggrieved party, but in no case shall this provision extend the time limitation.., by more
than 5 years.").
47.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(d) (providing for prosecution of any crime
based upon official misconduct by a public servant "at any time when [such person] is in
public office or employment or within 2 years thereafter," even if the limitations period
has already expired); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8(5)(B) (West 1964) (same).
48.
See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 202(c), at 466-68 (describing statutory
variations). Related to this discovery rationale are the statutes that extend the limitations
period when a child has been the victim of the offense. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 30.10(3)(f) (McKinney 1970) (providing that, in sexual offense cases in which a child is
the victim, the period of limitation "shall not begin to run until the child has reached the
age of eighteen or the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency or statewide central
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Concerns of fair dealing are at the heart of other exclusions,
under which the state policy balances fairness to the defendant
with an eye to the public good. One example is Minnesota's
qualification that its limitations periods "shall not include any
period during which the alleged offender participated under a
written agreement in a pretrial diversion program relating to
that offense. " ' Similar provisions are in effect in Ohio,"
Tennessee,5 1 and West Virginia.5 2 The overriding policy in these
cases is apparent: Defendants who are benefiting from an
opportunity to avoid facing criminal charges should not be
permitted to avail themselves of that advantage in order to derail
an otherwise timely prosecution.
The federal code and the statutes of forty-eight states
contain statutes of limitations for most offenses other than
murder.53 Although the range of limitations periods varies widely,
register of child abuse and maltreatment, whichever occurs earlier"); see 2 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 202(a), at 99-100 (2003-2004 Supp.) (summarizing
recent amendments to various states' statutes of limitations that lengthen the time in
which an offender can be prosecuted for certain crimes against minors).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.26(l) (West 2003).
49.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36(B)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
50.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105 (2003).
51.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-22(a)-(b) (Michie 2000).
52.
Almost all statutes of limitations exclude capital crimes and noncapital murder.
53.
See Adlestein, supra note 30, at 251-52. The Model Penal Code supported the absence of a
limitations period on murder, because "other crimes... are less likely to present equal
obstacles to prompt discovery of evidence or to have comparably long continued impact on
the sense of general security of the community." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 cmt. at 17
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956). But see id. (some members of the Council preferred no
exception to the principle of limitation).
Wyoming and South Carolina have no criminal statutes of limitation. See 2
ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 202(a) n.1, at 463. Several states exclude all felonies from
limitations periods. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050(l) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003)
(noting that no limitations period applies to felony prosecutions). In explaining its state's
policy, the Kentucky Crime Commission relied upon what it viewed as the State's
successful history eschewing limitations periods in cases of serious crime. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 500.050 cmt. (Banks-Baldwin 2003). It also reasoned that
there are substantial safeguards against an erroneous conviction because of the
staleness of evidence, e.g., imposition of burden of proof on the state,
requirement of belief in guilt beyond reasonable doubt, unanimity of decision as
to guilt, and right to a speedy trial. With these safeguards the need for a statute
of limitations is slight.
§ 500.050; see 2 ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 202(b), at 466 ("The trial process and the
rules of evidence are specifically designed either to exclude unreliable evidence or to
assure that the jury is aware of any such unreliability.").
Both prongs of the above reasoning are seriously flawed. The Kentucky Crime
Commission does not explain the basis for its favorable evaluation of the state's legal
history without limitations periods, and because the overwhelming number of states have
chosen to retain statutes of limitations, this query is not insubstantial. Substantively, the
Commission's claim that the ordinary rights of the accused at trial constitute 'substantial
safeguards" that effectively supplant the benefits of a limitations period merely begs the
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a rough estimation suggests that most states require felonies to
be prosecuted within three to six years and misdemeanors within
one to three years.5 4 A five-year limitation is enforced in
noncapital federal prosecutions.55 The Model Penal Code outlined
a four-part limitations framework: six years for the most serious
felonies; three years for other felonies; two years for
misdemeanors; and six months for petty misdemeanors or
violations.5 6 The nearly universal proliferation of statutes of
limitations lends considerable weight to an overall theme of
balanced attention to the needs of effective law enforcement and
the liberty of the accused.5 7 If the scales weighing this issue are
tipped at all, they tilt in favor of the accused. Statutes of
limitations "are favored in the law and are to be construed
liberally in favor of the accused and against the prosecutor."58 In
1970, Justice Harlan explained the primary rationale for favoring
criminal defendants over their civil counterparts in terms of the
greater social harm caused by an erroneous conviction:
In a civil suit between two private parties for money
damages,.., we view it as no more serious in general for
there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor
than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs
favor....
In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view
the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as
equivalent
to the disutility of acquitting someone who is
59
guilty.
Ultimately, inducing effective prosecution dovetails with a
concern for preventing erroneous convictions, and limitations
policy targets both objectives: "Statutes of limitation are founded

question. A defendant unquestionably has the right to challenge the veracity of the
prosecution's evidence, and standards related to the State's burden of proof greatly assist
in that regard. But no criminal procedural right can ever procure for the defendant such
evidence of innocence, or such evidence impeaching the prosecution's proof, as may have
been lost through the vagaries of time. Reliance on the right to a speedy trial is also inapt,
because that right attaches only after the presentation of charges, the very act that the
limitations period is designed to induce in a timely manner.
54. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.5(a) (4th ed. 2000).
55.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994).
56.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956).
57.
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (stating that statutes of
limitations "represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the
defendant in administering and receiving justice").
58.
State v. Palmer, 810 P.2d 734, 737 (Kan. 1991); see also United States v. Habig,
390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968) ("[C]riminal limitations statutes are 'to be liberally interpreted
in favor of repose.'" (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932))).
59.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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upon the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed
to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode
only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of the
availability.,60
accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond
B. The Impact of DNA Technology on Limitations Policy in
Sexual Offense Cases
Sexual assault6 cases involving DNA matching are at the
storm center of a reconsideration of the criminal justice system's
limitations policies. Driven by a vigorous social sense that rape
"traumatizes its victims long after the attack,"62 prosecutors,
victims' rights advocates, and elected officials have campaigned
for the extension or elimination of the limitations period for sex
offenses. 63 As one victims' rights campaigner testified before
Congress, "Because sex offenders pose a continuing danger to
society, and because of the terrible and lifelong impact of sexual
assault on victims, there should be no limitation on the

60. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp 777, 781 (D.N.J. 1942).
Unless the context specifies otherwise, this Article uses the terms "sexual
61.
assault" and "rape" interchangeably.
Suzanne M. Knight, Rights for the Rape Victim: Lifting Statute of Limitations
62.
for Prosecution of Violent Crimes, 8 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 11, 11 (2000); see H.R.J. Res. 36,
108th Cong. (2003) (affirming that "sexual assault victims suffer emotional scars long
after the physical scars have healed"); ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 1 (2001) ("The
threat of rape in contemporary U.S. society constitutes a persistent and pervasive element
in women's lives."); Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a
Behavioral Science Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 591, 596 (2000) (describing rape as a painfully traumatic experience resulting in
victims' feeling of fear, self-blame, anxiety, and devastation); Rape Treatment Ctr., UCLA
Med. Ctr., Impact of Rape, at http://www.911rape.org/RTC/Impact+of+Rape/Common+
Reactions (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) ("The emotional trauma caused by a sexual assault
can be severe and long-lasting."). The act of rape results in the most violent and intimate
violation of its victim-physically, emotionally, and psychologically. It is an offense that
can radically alter the life of its survivor, both by the trauma experienced during the
crime and in the lengthy recovery process that inevitably follows. LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN,
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 269 (1993). According to the U.S. Department
of Justice Crime Victimization Survey, in 2000 there were 92,000 rapes, 55,000 attempted
rapes, and 114,000 sexual assaults. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY tbl.1 (2000), http:lwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjslpub/pdf/cvus00.pdf.
See Knight, supra note 62, at 11 (citing nationwide efforts to change existing
63.
statutes of limitations); see also Miguel Bustillo, DNA Tests Fuel Drive for Longer Rape
Case Statute, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at A3 (reporting a bill to be considered by the
California legislature that would extend the limitations period by two years and eliminate
it entirely in cases in which DNA evidence is available); Robert Tanner, DNA Evidence
Pushes Legislatures Toward Dropping Statute of Limitations, DET. NEWS, Mar. 18, 2000,
available at http-/detnews.com/2000/nation/0003/18/03180110.htm (recognizing several
states that have extended, or are reconsidering, their statutes of limitations for
prosecuting rape and other violent crimes).
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prosecution of such crimes."" Unlike most criminals, rapists very
frequently leave behind identifiable biological evidence, and thus
the movement has initially focused on sexual assaults in which a
sample of the suspect's DNA has been obtained.
Although the legal and cultural understandings of rape have
significantly changed in the past generation,6 5 the prime motive
force behind the current push to expand greatly rape
prosecutions comes from the indelible nature of DNA itself and
the recent technological innovations allowing for individual
genetic profiling and, thus, viable prosecutions, many years after
the fact.66 A corollary rationale posits the irrelevance of
traditional defenses in cases in which DNA typing has made an
identification.6 7 What does it matter if the "defendant's alibi
witness[es] ha[ve] died after the statutory period if no reasonable
jury could have believed the alibi in the face of the DNA proof'?"
Similarly, objections based upon the disappearance of
documentation that might have suggested the accused's presence
elsewhere and the inability to cross-examine any nonforensic
prosecution witnesses who might have testified to the contrary
are rendered equally impotent.6 9
64.
On the Subject of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2002: HearingBefore
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, at http://www.ncvc.org/press/
speeches/dnatestimony.html (May 14, 2002) (statement of Susan Herman, Executive
Director for the National Center for Victims of Crime); see also Bustillo, supra note 63 ("In
statehouses across the country, pressure has been building to scrap statute-of-limitation
laws in light of DNA testing that has pointed to suspects in cases where the limits on
charges had long passed."); Tanner, supra note 63 ("With DNA solving crime after crime,
some states are extending or dropping the statute of limitations on prosecuting rape and
other violent offenses in case a genetic match that can prove who did it turns up decades
later.").
65.
See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAw REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 22, 161 (1992) (describing the widespread replacement of
statutes proscribing "rape" with those punishing sexual assault, sexual battery, or
criminal sexual content, and reasoning that the altered nomenclature "would emphasize
that rape is an assault and a crime of violence"); Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr.,
The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 72,
72-78 (2001) (describing the feminist advocacy that led to late twentieth century rape law
reform).
66.
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 36, 108th Cong. (2003) (noting that "because of recent
advances in DNA technology, law enforcement agencies have the potential to identify the
rapist in tens of thousands of unsolved cases" and that "aggressive prosecution can
incarcerate rapists and therefore prevent them from committing further crimes").
67.
See Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 472-73 (2001) ("[It could be argued [in such DNA cases]
that any degradation in the defendant's ability to mount a defense would be harmless
because it could not affect the outcome of the trial.").
68.
Id.
69.
See id. at 473 ("Many years later, the police officers and laboratory personnel
involved could be impossible to locate, and the written records remaining might be
inadequate to resolve these claims.").
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"Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes
°
"carries
the genetic information in all living organisms" and
7 Although
offspring."
to
parent
from
biological information...
its
DNA typing was highly controversial for several years after
7 2 the
cases,
criminal
in
initial use as a forensic identification tool
dispute over "the scientific validity of forensic DNA testing has
largely dissipated."7 3 According to the National Research Council,
there is no remaining debate about the accuracy with which
properly conducted DNA profiling can identify specific
"invariant
both
is
DNA
Moreover,
individuals.7 4
75 and recoverable virtually indefinitely.6
throughout... life"
§ 11DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES
70.
(2002).
1.1, at 665
Jury, 83
Robert D. Myers et al.,Complex Scientific Evidence and the
71.
JUDICATURE 150, 150 (1999).
each
A molecule of DNA is comprised of two nucleotide strands coiled around
rungs link
other and connected by rungs, like a twisted ladder. The strands and
biochemical
thousands of small components which exist in a number of
for identical
variations and are arranged differently for every individual except
twins.
United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992)).
for the
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 413-14 ("[DNA's] suitability
72.
press,
popular
the
in
courtroom was bitterly contested. Significant questions were raised
courts."
appellate
and
trial
in
course,
of
and,
reviews,
law
publishers,
books from scientific
used in 1986 in
(footnotes omitted)). DNA testing in criminal investigations was first
OF FORENSIC
METHODS
SCIENCE:
CRIME
FISCHER,
F.
JOHN
&
NICKELL
England. See JOE
successfully used
DETECTION 201-02 (1999). In the United States, DNA evidence was first
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
in a 1987 Florida rape case. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 842
of DNA evidence
admissibility
the
1988) (commenting that no existing case law addressed
technique").
scientific
new
"a
as
it
and describing
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 414.
73.
See COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION
74.
("The technology for
OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 2 (1996) [hereinafter NRC, UPDATE]
statistics have
related
and
frequencies
DNA profiling and the methods for estimating
collected and
properly
of
validity
and
reliability
the
where
point
the
to
progressed
note 70,
supra
AL.,
ET
FAIGMAN
also
see
analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt.");
and the
differentiation,
genetic
DNA,
of
structure
the
(describing
697-705
at
§ 11-2.0,
statement
The
identification).
individual
for
allow
to
process of utilizing those differences
applies to
in the text about the scientific consensus on the validity of DNA identification
A
671-72.
at
11-1.2.1,
§
id.
See
typing.
DNA
of
the most commonly accepted forms
of this Article.
discussion of emergent DNA sequencing technologies is beyond the scope
techniques
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 458 (describing novel DNA
"rang[ing] from the use of new genetic systems and new analytical procedures to the
typing of DNA from plants and animals").
or
Yale H. Yee, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforcement
75.
Michelle
also
see
(1995);
463-64
461,
L.
Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM.
34 WAKE
Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?,
genome.").
one's
alter
to
possible
FOREST L. REV. 767, 791 (1999) ("[I]t is not yet
DNA
See Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit:
76.
(noting
Databasesfor 21st Century, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 673 n.105 (2000)
maintained);
that samples of DNA can remain viable for thousands of years if properly
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DNA identification is currently admissible in virtually all
state and federal courts.7 7 One serious controversy surrounding
the introduction of DNA evidence involves neither its chemical
structure nor its ostensible permanence. As is common with
scientific proof, the core of the problem involves how the new
procedure is actually conducted in light of the claims made on its
behalf.78 Enthusiasts have dubbed DNA "'the greatest single
breakthrough in the fight against crime since fingerprints,' 7 and
the "single greatest advance in the 'search for truth'. .. since the
advent of cross-examination."80 Far less attention has been paid
to the manner in which DNA evidence is actually obtained and
analyzed and to the factors leading to false or misleading forensic
testimony in many sexual assault cases.8 1
The impassioned declarations on the superlative qualities of
DNA conflate two discrete issues: the theoretical infallibility of
DNA identification and the practical impossibility that DNA
collection, analysis, and testimony will always be conducted in
accordance with proper scientific rigor. The widespread
acceptance of the unerring nature of DNA technology is reflected
in the recognition and approval the bench and bar have bestowed
on this testimony. Courts have historically "treated [scientific]
evidence more like magic than science,"82 and the reception of
Sediment Cores Yield Oldest DNA Yet Discovered, ScientificAmerican.Com,
at
http://www.sciam.com/news directory.cfm (Apr. 18, 2003) ("Researchers
have retrieved
from sediment cores plant DNA that is nearly 400,000 years old-the
oldest such
specimen ever recovered.").
77.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-1.1, at 665 & n.2. For a useful overview
of
the process of DNA analysis, see Valdivieso, supra note 7, at 1012-29.
78.
See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 414 (observing that "more subtle
issues of criminal procedure and evidence often arise when DNA is employed
in the
investigations and trials[,] ...[but] many of these new matters have yet to
be extensively
litigated").
79.
Renskers, supra note 6, at 309 (quoting DNA Testing on the Increase,
131
SOLICITOR 1596 (1987)).
80.
People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (County Ct. 1988), affd, 589 N.Y.S.2d
197 (App. Div. 1992).
81.
Even in the many cases in which DNA forensic analysis has led to the release
of
improperly convicted individuals, see generally Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark
Side of DNA
Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the CriminalDefendant, 42
STAN. L. REV.
465 (1990), the reports have emphasized the role played by DNA testing
in establishing
scientific validation of the impossibility of guilt. See generally id.; William
Thompson,
Actual Innocence: Lessons Learned From Incorrect Declarations
of Matches, at
http://www.bioforensics.com/conference04/ActualInnocence/index.html (last
visited Nov.
12, 2004) [hereinafter Thompson, Actual Innocence] (discussing cases in
which false
positives resulted in false convictions). Comparatively little attention is paid
to the fact
that some of those cases involved earlier, improper DNA testing resulting
in the
erroneous conviction.
82.
Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with ForensicIdentificationScience, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1071
(1998).
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DNA technology into courtrooms has repeated this historical
83
error. Regarded as "in theory foolproof in identifying a suspect,"
DNA technology "has been used in thousands of homicide, rape
and paternity cases-often with little challenge from defense
attorneys."84 Recently, however, evidence has begun to mount
that the application of DNA technology in laboratories and
courtrooms often fails to conform to the demands of scientific
methodology. 5
Still, the possibility that DNA evidence may unequivocally
identify a rapist decades after the offense has led to calls for the
elimination of statutes of limitations, because DNA's "nearperfect certainty"" has rendered the concept of a limitations
period "obsolete law."87 State legislatures have flocked to heed
this call, and many have either eliminated or markedly extended
their limitations periods in sexual offense and other cases,
sometimes-but not always-conditioning the extension upon an
event such as the victim's reporting the offense to the authorities
or the recovery of a DNA sample from the crime scene. For
example, Oregon has extended its statute of limitations for filing
charges in serious sexual offense cases from six years to twelve if
the defendant was identified after the original limitations period
8
on the basis of DNA sample comparisons. Connecticut's new law
Kenneth B. Noble, Simpson Judge and Jury to Get Crucial Lesson in DNA
83.
Testing, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at Al.
Id.
84.
Refer to Part III.A, D infra (discussing issues of incompetence and corruption in
85.
laboratory analysis of, and courtroom testimony regarding, DNA samples).
Chapman, supra note 1; see Stephen G. Michaud, DNA Detectives, N.Y. TIMES,
86.
Nov. 6, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 70 ("The potential for 100 percent certainty makes [DNA]
a singular forensic tool. The best that other techniques, such as serology and hairanalysis, can hope to establish is a 90 to 95 percent level of certainty, leaving room for
reasonable doubt, and acquittal.").
Chapman, supra note 1; see Kim Kozlowski, Rape Victim: Change Laws so
87.
Criminals Can't Elude Arrest, DET. NEWS, May 30, 2000, at 6A (reporting desire to
abolish limitations periods in sexual assault cases).
more
no
is
there
where
world
a
in
us
puts
DNA just
guesswork .... DNA... doesn't forget. It doesn't forget if it's 10 years old, if it's
15 years old, if it's 20 years old. And so now that we live in a world where we
collect DNA evidence, the statute [of limitations] is an anachronism. It no longer
serves the purpose.
Science & Technology, Policy Allows Prosecutors to Use DNA Evidence 6to7 Indict Before
.stm (Nov. 12,
IndividualIdentified, Open Here, at http:/openhere.com/current/6505061
2003) (quoting John Feinblatt, New York City's Criminal Justice Coordinator).
OR. REV. STAT. § 131.125(8) (2001). Delaware has extended the time within
88.
which a sexual felony prosecution must commence from five years to ten, "if based upon
forensic DNA testing." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(i) (2001). Taking a broad sweep,
Delaware's new ten-year limitations period is not limited to sexual violations, but extends
to the prosecution of any criminal action previously subject to a statute of limitations.
§ 205(b), (i).
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extends the time frame for prosecution of specified sexual
assaults to twenty years from the date of the commission of the
offense, with two provisos: (1) the victim must have notified a
police officer or state's attorney of the rape within five years of its
occurrence, and (2) the identity of the person who allegedly
committed the offense must have been established through a
DNA profile comparison using evidence collected at the time of
the commission of the offense. 9 Recent Arkansas legislation
manifests faith in the development of ever more accurate forensic
identification techniques and extends them a priori approval. The
Arkansas state legislature elongated the limitations period in
rape to fifteen years in cases in which the prosecution is "based
upon forensic deoxyribonucleic acid... testing or other tests
which may become available through advances in technology. ""
Other states have enacted potentially far more extensive
enlargements of the limitations period. This type of legislation
does away with absolute temporal finality, instead pegging the
end date for prosecution to a specified time after DNA testing
establishes the offender's identity. California's approach
illustrates this trend: its new statute enlarges the limitations
period in sex offenses from six years to "10 years from the
commission of the offense, or one year from the date on which the
identity of the suspect is conclusively established by DNA
testing, whichever is later."9' Oklahoma now allows serious
89.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-193b (West 2001). In Oregon, a new amendment
provides that
a prosecution for rape in the first or second degree or sodomy in the first or
second degree may be commenced within 12 years after the commission of the
crime if the defendant is identified after [the six years provided by the default
statute of limitations] of this section on the basis of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)
sample comparisons.
OR. REV. STAT. § 131.125(8).
90.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
91.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(i)(1) (West 2001). The new statute adds two
requirements: (a) for offenses committed before January 1, 2001, "biological evidence
collected in connection with the offense [must be] analyzed for DNA type no later than
January 1, 2004"; (b) for offenses committed on or after January 1, 2001, biological
evidence must be analyzed "no later than two years from the date of the offense." § 803
(i)(1)(A), (B). Kansas has adopted a similar statute, providing that prosecutions for
specified sexual offenses "must be commenced within the limitation of time provided by
the law pertaining to such offense or one year from the date on which the identity of the
suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing, whichever is later." KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 2 1-3106(7)(a) (Supp. 2003).
Wisconsin's rather more complex new statutory scheme crafts a potentially
unlimited extension of time for commencing sexual offense prosecutions, conditioned on
the following: within six years of the commission of the offense, if the state "collected
biological material that is evidence of the identity of the person who committed" the crime
and identified a DNA profile from the biological material, and if comparisons of that DNA
profile to other profiles of known persons "did not result in a probable identification of the

20041

IN PRAISE OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

1223

sexual offense prosecutions to commence within three years of
DNA identification, as long as the victim notified law
92
enforcement within seven years of the discovery of the crime.
Changes in Michigan statutes similarly afford extraordinary
leeway to future criminal sexual conduct prosecutions:
If evidence of the [sexual conduct] violation is obtained
and that evidence contains DNA that is determined to be
from an unidentified individual, an indictment against that
individual for the violation may be found and filed at any
time after the offense is committed. However, after the
individual is identified, the indictment shall be found and
filed within 10 years after the individual is identified or by
victim's twenty-first birthday, whichever is
the alleged
93
later.

In Michigan, therefore, police and prosecutors have an unlimited
time to attempt to match a crime-scene DNA sample to a suspect,
and, after a potential defendant is identified, they have ten years
to file an indictment.94
Other states have abolished their statutes of limitations in
cases in which DNA evidence is used, in whole or in part, to
identify the sex offender and in which the victim has reported the

the
person who is the source of the biological material," then the state may commence
sexual offense prosecution of the person "who is the source of the biological
the
material ... within 12 months after comparison of the [DNA] profile relating to
ANN.
violation results in a probable identification of the person." WIS. STAT.
§ 939.74(2d)(b) (West Supp. 2003).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152(c)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004). Prosecution,
92.
under Oklahoma law, is also dependent upon the collection and preservation of physical
of the
evidence capable of being tested to obtain a DNA profile and the identification
Id.
evidence.
that
using
profile
offender through the use of a DNA
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 767.24(2)(b) (West Supp. 2004). The statute defines
93.
"identified" as meaning that "the individual's legal name is known and he or she has been
determined to be the source of the DNA." § 767.24(2)(c)(ii). Note that this statutory
definition of "identified" is at odds with the understanding adopted in several jurisdictions
of
that obtaining a DNA profile alone sufficiently identifies a defendant for statute
and
limitations purposes. Refer to Part I1.C infra (discussing genetic marker warrants
indictments).
See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.24(2)(b). In similar fashion, New Jersey
94.
retained its five-year limitation period in aggravated sexual conduct cases, but provided
that
when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor
by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis, time does not start to run until
the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or
fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by
means of comparison to the physical evidence.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(a), (c) (West Supp. 2004).
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attack to a law enforcement officer within a prescribed time.
Colorado's statute typifies this trend:
In any case in which the identity of the defendant is
determined, in whole or in part, by patterned chemical
structure of genetic information, and in which the offense
has been reported to a law enforcement agency.., within
ten years after the commission of the offense, there shall be
no limit on the period of time during which a person may be
prosecuted after the commission of the offense as to any
[specified sexual] offense charged. 95
Finally, some states have simply abolished the statute of
limitations in sex offense cases, whether or not DNA evidence is
available.96
Much more than a recalibration of limitations periods, these
provisions constitute a striking reconsideration of the role of time
limits in penal theory, driven by-but not restricted toinnovations in forensic science. In their new configuration, many
of these statutes constitute a sublimation of the traditional
balancing concept at the heart of limitations theory into a nearly
exclusive reliance on the supposed probative guarantee of the
new science.97 We can thus see the conversion of DNA, as well as
95.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16 -5-401(a.5) (2003); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(1)(b)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2004) ("[P]rosecution for a [specified sexual battery], if such
crime is
reported to a law enforcement agency within 72 hours after commission of the
crime, may
be commenced at any time."); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1(c.1) (Supp. 2003) (providing
that
prosecution for rape and other specified felonies may be commenced at any
time when
DNA evidence is used to identify the perpetrator and stating that there is no requirement
that the victim report the crime to authorities within a specified time, but "a
sufficient
portion of the physical evidence tested for DNA [must be] preserved and available
for
testing by the accused"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.26(e) (West 2003) (permitting
sexual
offenses to be brought "at any time after commission of the offense, if physical
evidence is
collected and preserved that is capable of being tested for its DNA characteristics");
NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.083 (Michie Supp. 2001) (providing for "[n]o limitation
for sexual
assault if written report filed with law enforcement officer during period of limitation");
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12.01(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (abolishing the
limitations
period for sexual assault prosecutions "if during the investigation of the offense
biological
matter is collected and subjected to forensic DNA testing and the testing results
show
that the matter does not match the victim or any other person whose identity
is readily
ascertained").
96.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.010 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13107(A) (West Supp. 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (Supp. 2003); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 301-8(G) (Michie Supp. 2003). Vermont distinguishes between "aggravated sexual
assault,"
a crime that may be prosecuted indefinitely, and "sexual assault", which
must be
prosecuted within six years. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4501(a), (b) (Supp. 2003).
97.
See Steve Seidenberg, Time's Running Out for Time Limits: More States
EliminatingStatutes of Limitations for Some Crimes, ABA Journal eReport, Sept.
5, 2003,
LEXIS ("'The prosecution is at the crime scene right away, collecting evidence.
The
defense can only begin collecting evidence years later, when someone is charged
with the
crime .... So these laws give [prosecutors] a 10, 20, 40-year head start
to collect
evidence." (second alteration in original) (quoting Professor Albert Scherr)).
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9
9
other forensic technologies both old and as yet uninvented," into
evidentiary truth serums not prone to time's caprice. This
' °°
overhauling of statutes of limitations is likely to continue.
Nor is this statutory trend limited to sexual offenses. Recent
legislation has dramatically expanded the category of offenses
excluded from the traditional limitations period on the basis of
DNA identification." For example, in 2003, Utah amended its
limitations statute to permit the commencement of a wide range
of prosecutions for up to one year after a DNA identification of
the perpetrator. 2 In addition to serious sexual felonies, the
offenses exempt from the ordinary limitations period in Utah
include homicide, arson, criminal mischief, kidnapping, burglary
of a dwelling, and robbery. 10 3 Similarly, when Governor George
Pataki called for reform of New York's statute of limitations, he
did not limit the scope of his proposals to sexual assault crimes.'
Rather, he advocated eliminating the limitations period for a
range of serious violent felonies, including first-degree rape,
manslaughter, and assault.' He articulated a vision of penal law
in which statutes of limitation are seen as only obstructions in
the way of securing a justly merited conviction:
"There is no statute of limitations on anguish. There is no
statute of limitations on pain. If my bill becomes law, there
will be no statute of limitations on justice here in New
York .... Heinous and violent crimes, such as rape, leave
the survivors with severe and long-lasting physical and

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(a), (c) (West Supp. 2004) (fingerprinting).
98.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 2003) (mentioning "other
99.
tests which may become available through advances in technology").
See Diehl, supra note 7, at 432 (predicting that more state legislatures "will be
100.
tempted to adapt their laws to facilitate the use of DNA evidence" as the technology
continues to develop).
See Seidenberg, supra note 97 (describing the National Conference of State
101.
Legislatures' study reporting that, in 2000-2003, "seven states ... eliminated their
statutes of limitations for various crimes, and 13 [others] have either removed or tolled
those statutes when DNA evidence is available to identify the culprit").
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302(2), (3) (2003).
102.
§ 76-3-203.5(1)(c)(i)(A)-(P). Recent Indiana legislation also illustrates this trend.
103.
The traditional statute of limitations for all class B and class C felonies was five years.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-2(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2004). The legislature extended the
limitations period until one year after the state, through the use of DNA, discovers the
identity of the offender or could have discovered it with the exercise of due diligence. See
§ 35-41-4-2(b)(1), (2). The statute thereby exempts from the traditional limitations periods
not only sexual offense felonies, but also all felonies punishable by a minimum sentence of
two years or more. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-1(c)(3), (4) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2004).
See Press Release, Governor: End Statute of Limitations on Rape, Expand DNA
104.
Databank, at http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/year00/feb23-OO.htm (Feb. 23, 2000)
(describing New York Governor Pataki's proposals).
Id.
105.
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emotional scars. Because the trauma suffered by victims
can often last a lifetime, there should be no arbitrary time
limit on seeking justice."1°'
Securing retribution and redressing the victim encompasses,
in this view, the entire penal raison d'etre. There are no entries
on the other side of the ledger: no concern for dimming memories
or disappearing proof; no regard for the traditional wisdom that
the need for prosecution generally fades over the passage of
many years; no acknowledgment of the need to prod the human
and technical machinery of the state to act in a timely fashion in
apprehending and prosecuting wrongdoers; and fundamentally,
no sense that statutes of limitations reflect society's desire to
reduce the risk of erroneous conviction. The success of DNA
typing in identifying sexual offenders may have served as the
trigger for this statutory renovation, but the boundaries of this
expansion have not yet been determined."'
The current trend in statutory revision also appears to give
diminishing weight to one major component of the rationale for
limitations periods: the need for diligent, expeditious prosecution.
The
traditional
view
counseled
that
"statutes
of
limitations... aid the state in checking upon its officials by
requiring vigilance on their part in discovering law-violators and
bringing them to justice as speedily as possible." °8 The drive to
extend or eliminate statutes of limitations was sparked by the
advent of accurate DNA identification.' 5 But some of the new
statutes cater to a different DNA reality: the immense backlog of
0
unexamined DNA data."1
C. Indicting "JohnDoe, Unknown Male with Matching
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profile"
Some prosecutors have been unwilling to wait for their state
legislatures to reform the limitations periods on sex offenses. On
106. Id. (quoting George Pataki).
107. See A Penetrable Barrier, supra note 17, at 651 (concluding that "existing
statutes seem to have been drafted with little consideration of the aims which the
limitations should achieve").
108. Id. at 633; see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992) ("Condoning
prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants
for the state's fault and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of
criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority."); Adlestein, supra note 30, at
261-62 ("The Supreme Court's rationale for criminal statutes of limitations ...us[es] the
sanction of preclusion to encourage law enforcement officials to promptly investigate and
prosecute crime.").
109. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 471.
110. Refer to notes 185-96 infra and accompanying text (discussing pressure on
forensic analysts because of huge backlog of untested DNA samples).
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September 1, 1999, a Milwaukee, Wisconsin prosecutor filed a
"futuristic arrest warrant""' for rape, charging 'John Doe,
unknown Male' with matching DNA [profile] 'at genetic locations
D1S7, D2S44, D5S110, D10S28 and D17S79. ' , 112 The criminal
complaint in that case was filed shortly before the expiration of
the six-year Wisconsin statute of limitations."3 In order to
"preserve rape cases that remain unsolved but threaten to be lost
to the statute of limitations,"" similar warrants have been filed
and indictments returned across the country against many John
Does who are identified only by their DNA profiles."'
Doege, supra note 4. An earlier but far less publicized indictment identifying a
111.
defendant solely by reference to his DNA profile was returned in Kansas in 1991. See
Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 982 (describing a 1991 DNA arrest warrant obtained by a
Kansas prosecutor in an effort to toll the existing five-year statute of limitations).
Doege, supra note 4; see also Glenn McGee, Wanted: John Doe, aka GATTACA
112.
(Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with Author) (describing the 'John Doe" warrant). A copy of the
criminal complaint is on file with the Author.
See Bill Dedman, A Rape Defendant With No Identity, But a DNA Profile, N.Y.
113.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at Al; Norman A. Gahn & Susan Bieber Kennedy, From John Doe to
Known Offender: DNA Profile Arrest Warrants, SILENT WITNESS (Am. Prosecutors Res.
Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Nov. 1, 2002, at http://ndaa.org/publications/newsletters/silentwitness_volume 7 number_1_2002.html. In that case, the police and prosecutor believed,
based on the rapist's modus operandi, that the same man was responsible for three rapes.
John Doe, D1S7, D2S44, D5S110, D10S28, D17S79, Charged with Rape, Feb. 2000
[hereinafter Interview with Norman Gahn], available at http://www.promega.com/profiles/
303/ProfilesinDNA_303_08.pdf. The statute of limitations had run on the first two rapes,
and the authorities decided to file the DNA warrant before the time for charging the
suspect with the third rape expired. Id. At that time, the Wisconsin statute of limitations
for rape was six years. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.74(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003). The law
was amended in 2001 to provide that, if prior to the expiration of the six-year period, the
state
collected biological material that is evidence of the identity of the person who
committed [a specified sexual offense], the state identified a [DNA] profile from
the biological material, and comparisons of that [DNA] profile to [DNA] profiles
of known persons did not result in a probable identification of the person who is
the source of the biological material, the state may commence prosecution of the
person who is the source of the biological material for violation of [a specified
sexual offense] within 12 months after comparison of the [DNA] profile relating
to the violation results in a probable identification of the person.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.74(2d)(b) (Supp. 2003).
Meredith A. Bieber, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using "John Doe"
114.
Indictments Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1079,
1079 & n.1 (2002).
Id.; see also Valdivieso, supra note 7, at 1009-10 n.2 (citing DNA warrants filed
115.
in Wisconsin, New York, California, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Kansas, Utah, Missouri,
and Texas); Steve Aveson, DNA Used to Indict Suspect Before Statute of Limitations Runs
in Rape Case (Mar. 18, 2000) (on file with Author) (describing the indictment of the 'East
Side rapist" in New York, which identified the defendant only by his genetic profile);
Julian E. Barnes, East Side Rapist, Known Solely by DNA, Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2000, at B1 (same); Michael Luo, Unnamed Man Indicted by DNA: Suffolk DA
Charges Suspect in 6 South Shore Rapes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 2000, at A03 (describing an
indictment that provided no name, "instead listing a series of letters and numbers
designating certain measurements of DNA segments that, taken together, represent the
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This prosecutorial innovation aims "to aggressively pursue
sex offenders by indefinitely preserving the ability to
prosecute."116 In 2003, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
launched a city-wide "John Doe Indictment Project" targeted at
the city's unsolved rape cases, on at least 600 of which the
statute of limitations was about to run."7 These prosecutions
seek legal justification by arguing that a DNA profile is a
singular and sufficient way of identifying a defendant and that a
timely charge so brought complies with the statute of limitations.
The Wisconsin prosecutor who filed the 1999 "John Doe" warrant
elaborated the rationale:
The [state statute on warrants] mandates that the warrant
name the person to be arrested or, if the person's name is
not known, designate the person to be arrested by any
description by which the person can be identified with
reasonable certainty. Since I believe that a [DNA profile]
match provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt about the
identity of the perpetrator, it certainly provides the
"reasonable certainty" requirement for the warrant. 8
Although the issue is too recent to have received many court
tests, DNA warrants have so far received judicial affirmation
when challenged."9 In Wisconsin in 2003, an appellate court
affirmed a kidnapping and sexual assault conviction in a case in
which the complaint initially identified the accused only as "John
Doe #12" with his DNA profile. 2 ° The court ruled that the
original complaint and the arrest warrant, which were officially
produced three days before the expiration of the state statute of
limitations,
both
satisfied
the
"reasonable
certainty"
identification requirements and complied with the statute of
limitations.12 ' The court concluded that "a DNA profile is
arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal
identification possible."'22 Such a holding is of a piece with the
rapist's unique DNA profile").
116.
See Sabrina Tavernise, Police Tracing "John Doe" DNA, Name Suspect in Old
Sex Crime, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2004, at Al.
117.
Rebecca Porter, DNA Evidence Changes for Whom the Statutes Toll, TRIAL, Feb.
2004, at 12, 12; see Tavernise, supra note 116 (describing the "John Doe Indictment
Project," a New York City effort "in which prosecutors, investigators and scientists seek to
tie the most serious sex crimes to DNA profiles, and then file charges even before they
have identified a suspect").
118. Interview with Norman Gahn, supra note 113.
119.
See Bieber, supra note 114, at 1081-82 n.12 (describing lower court opinions in
California and Wisconsin that sustained DNA warrants against constitutional challenge).
120. State v. Dabney, 663 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
121. Id. at 372-74.
122. Id. at 372.
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rapid rise and increasing velocity of the legislative movement
enlarging or repealing statutes of limitations in sex offense
cases." 3 With the arrival of DNA technology, the supposed
certainty of genetic identification will almost always trump the
arguments cautioning care before sanctioning procedural artifice
in maintaining a sexual offense prosecution.
The argument on this issue pivots on whether the required
"identification" at the time of filing charges must be capable of
general understanding by the defendant and the community at
large.'2 4 DNA profiling may satisfactorily establish the accused's
"identity" in a genetic sense.12' But detailing a numerical cluster
of genetic characteristics, undecipherable without DNA analysis
and expertise, cannot in any sense constitute adequate notice.
Nor is it so intended. The proponents of these instruments do not
pretend that the DNA profile conveys any notice to the
offender.2 2 DNA warrants and indictments are designed
exclusively "to prevent the relevant statutes of limitations from
barring prosecution when and if investigators later identify the
suspects."'27
However, the "central policy underlying statutes of
limitation is timely notice to the defendant."'2 8 Timely warrants
and indictments serve this doctrine by apprising defendants
"that they will be called to account for their activities and should
prepare a defense."'29 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized
the similar purposes of civil and criminal limitations statutes,
noting that both "represent a legislative judgment about the
balance of equities in a situation involving the tardy assertion of
otherwise valid rights: 'The theory is that even if one has a just

123.
Refer to notes 88-103 supra and accompanying text.
See Interview with Norman Gahn, supra note 113 (commenting that the solving
124.
of old cases through DNA typing will "cause the public to see the value, and hopefully
encourage state legislators to take notice and properly fund the crime laboratories").
"People can change their names, dates of birth and even their appearance, but
125.
they cannot change their genetic codes." Id.
126.
See DNA Used to Indict Unidentified Rapist, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Mar. 16, 2000, at A7 ("A 'John Doe' indictment is legal if it contains a sufficient
'DNA certainly fits that bill." (quoting Professor H.
description of the suspect ....
Richard Uviller)).
127.
Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 983; see Leslie Hoffman, N.M. Hopes DNA Saves
Rape Cases, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Apr. 21, 2000, at A3 (describing the work of prosecutors
in several states who are "trying to keep rape cases which are threatened by a statute-oflimitations violation alive by filing formal charges against unknown defendants who have
left only their genetic fingerprints on sex crimes").
128.
United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 179 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Gengo, 808 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[N]otice to defendants is at the core of the
limitations doctrine.").
129.
United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 1976).
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claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation.""' 3 The rule at common law was
straightforward: "a warrant for the arrest of a person charged
with crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to
identify him." 31 There can be no doubt that this principle
regarded the concept of identification as both record keeping and
notice providing. The Model Penal Code in 1956 expressed the
then-unchallenged view that "the basic purpose of a statute of
limitations is to insure that the accused will be informed of the
decision to prosecute and the general nature of the charge with
sufficient promptness to allow him to prepare his defense before
evidence of his innocence becomes weakened with age."' 3 2 In
order to satisfy the statute of limitations, a prosecution was
deemed to have commenced upon either the finding of an
indictment or the issuance of a warrant, "provided
that such
133
warrant is executed without unreasonable delay.'
The newly minted DNA procedure, by contrast, merely aims
to toll the statute in order to afford the State an unlimited time
to "identify" the suspect.3 3 This method fails to provide the
defendant with fair warning that he has been charged until after
he has been arrested, which may occur many years after the

130.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971) (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
131.
West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894); see United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494,
497 (2d. Cir. 1977) ("To comply with [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 4(c)(1) and the
fourth amendment the name or a particularized description of the person to be arrested
must appear on the face of the 'John Doe' warrant."). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
4(b)(1)(A) provides, "A warrant must contain the defendant's name, or, if it is unknown, a
name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty."
Cf United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 747-48 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding a warrant
describing its subject only as "John Doe a/k/a 'Ed'" insufficient on the grounds that there
were thousands of individuals nicknamed "Ed" where the warrant was executed). The
articulation of these principles predated DNA and could not possibly have anticipated the
dilemma of a defendant's description that both "identifie[s] with reasonable certainty,"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1)(A), and yet remains largely indecipherable to the defendant as
well as to the general public. Interestingly, this issue never arose regarding DNA's
forensic predecessor, fingerprinting, as apparently no warrant or indictment was ever
obtained that identified the accused solely by his or her fingerprints. See Bernasconi,
supra note 4, at 1014-16 (suggesting reasons why prosecutors have never obtained a
"fingerprint" indictment).
132.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 cmt. at 24-25 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956); accord 2
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 54, § 18.5(a), at 424-25 (analyzing the purpose of statutes of
limitations in reducing the likelihood of erroneous convictions).
133.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(5).
134. See Frank B. Ulmer, Using DNA Profiles to Obtain "JohnDoe" Arrest Warrants
and Indictments, 58 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1585, 1623 (2001) ("[Law enforcement officials]
have all made it very clear that the sole reason for charging a "John Doe" with a specific
genetic profile was to toll the statute of limitations . . ").
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crime.' DNA indictments and warrants are thus illicit end-runs
around the requirement that an accused be provided with notice
of pending charges in order to enable the preparation of a
defense."' Unlike information supplying a known alias, a
physical description, or distinguishing data in common use such
as a social security number, the publication of a person's genetic
profile is so impossibly unlikely to alert that person that it seems
reasonable to infer that notification of the accused is no longer a
relevant factor. One final consideration suggests the logical
incoherence of allowing DNA indictments to satisfy limitations
statutes: Once this procedure is deemed acceptable, why would
any prosecutor fail to secure an indictment in every rape case
immediately and routinely upon the completion of the genetic
then have effectively
analysis? In this way, the prosecution would 137
rendered the statute of limitations a nullity.
Fortified with this review of the current issues in the
interplay of a limitations period with evidence that theoretically
admits of no limitations, you consider anew your client's case.
Your client asserts his innocence in the face of the State's asserted
DNA match. Could your client be factually innocent? How can you
pierce the armor of DNA evidence? What might explain a DNA
mismatch? The next Partof the Article examines our experience of
human error and corruption in handling and presenting DNA
evidence in court.

See id. at 1617-20 (criticizing DNA warrants for skewing the balance between
135.
the public and the accused to the prejudice of the latter); Bieber, supra note 114, at 1080
(describing the view that a DNA warrant is "a disingenuous device of the prosecution that
evades the statute of limitations and infringes on the constitutional rights of the
accused"); Sean Gardiner, Clue in the Genes: At-Large Suspect Indicted in Rapes by DNA
Sample, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 2000, at A05, available at 2000 WL 10002320 ("[Tlhe John
Doe indictment is a 'very creative way to circumvent the statute of limitations' but should
not hold up under a court challenge. 'The purpose of the statute of limitations is not for
the district attorney, it's for the accused... [to] have an opportunity to prepare a
defense.'" (quoting Gerald Lefcourt, former president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers)).
See Bieber, supra note 114, at 1086 (commenting that DNA indictments would
136.
likely not give the accused sufficient notice of the charges against him "unless he actually
knows his genetic profile").
See Battle Under Way on John Doe Warrant, UPI, July 9, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
137.
Library, UPI File (quoting attorney Lynn Ellen Hackbarth as worrying that "no statu[t]es
of limitation would run for any crime in which scientific evidence, such as fingerprints, is
left behind"); Porter, supra note 117 ("'Charging a genetic profile is the same as repealing
the statute of limitations in sex cases.'" (quoting Patrick Sullivan, a Minneapolis attorney
with the Hennepin County public defender's office)).
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III. FROM THE CRIME SCENE TO THE COURTROOM: BREAKING THE
"MYSTICAL SPELL" OF

DNA

DNA forensic procedures have attained the courtroom air of
inerrancy. The "mystical spell" 3 ' of DNA induces many to confuse
the call for procedural rigor and sensitivity to human fallibility
with a challenge to the underlying science of DNA. Some argue
that because a defendant is not actually arrested under a DNA
warrant "until his DNA is matched to the profile in the
warrant,"'39 this procedure "foreclos[es] the possibility of
mistaken arrest."'40 This contention assumes that no untoward
events have occurred that adversely impact the accuracy of the
match. But it is the very evidence of these extraneous events that
the passage of time renders increasingly hard to establish. The
danger remains that "when DNA evidence implicates you, you
are nailed, and a conviction is a foregone conclusion."""' Accurate
representations about the scientific basis of DNA can become
misleading when they imply that the introduction of DNA
evidence not only assumes procedural regularity but also washes
away the need to examine any corroborative or contradictory
evidence. 4 '
138.
McDonald, supra note 6, at 362; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Coming to
Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert's "Brave New World": The Court's Need to
Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Proficiency Studies, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1995) (citing the expressed fear that science is "'a veritable
sorcerer in our computerized society,' a sorcerer who can 'cast a spell'" over the factfinder
at trial) (quoting People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968)).
139.
Valdivieso, supra note 7, at 1046.
140.
Id.
141.
John Hinton & Michelle Johnson, Without Doubt: Evidence Piles Up, But the
Jury Is Still Out on Value of DNA Testing, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 18, 2001 (quoting Rob
Warden, Director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University
School of Law), available at 2001 WL 3041086. Overstatements about the power of DNA
are not the preserve of either prosecution or defense. For every prosecutor touting, "We
have a foolproof test to use[,]" Rob Stein, Genetic Fingerprints: A Boon to Law
Enforcement or a Rights Violation?, PA. L.J. REP., May 2, 1988, at 12, there is a defense
attorney pouting, "If they print your guy with this stuff you're dead ....You can't combat
it. There is no defense to it." Michaud, supra note 86, at 89.
142.
See, e.g., Bieber, supra note 114, at 1089 (dismissing "the risk that important
evidence will be lost over time" with resulting prejudice to the accused in a rape case
where crime scene DNA is available, by observing that "DNA evidence is less susceptible
to losing its probative value over time than other types of evidence"); C.J. Chivers, As
DNA Aids Rape Inquiries, Statutory Limits Block Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1
(referring to DNA evidence "with its virtual near lock in establishing guilt or innocence"
(quoting Professor Stephen Gillers)). DNA evidence will indeed likely outlast all other
evidence, but this proves only the relative permanence of genetic identity. See Bieber,
supra note 114, at 1089 (noting that the evidentiary value of DNA does not degrade over
time). It does not speak to whether the DNA in question has been properly collected,
analyzed and maintained and whether accurate testimony will be given in connection
with its presentation in court.
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How carefully is DNA analyzed and preserved? DNA
matching is regarded as well-nigh infallible as long as the
sometimes microscopic quantity of DNA evidence is handled with
the utmost care in order to achieve its vaunted accuracy in
identification.14 Thus, you might expect to find that forensic
laboratories are both highly motivated to excel and tightly
regulated to comply with quality control standards and that
errors are uncommon and promptly exposed and remedied. In all
these assumptions, you would be mistaken. The record of DNA
analysis and maintenance is littered with incompetence, fraud,
and spoliation of the very lifeblood evidence entrusted to the
laboratories and then brought into court. 4 4 The quantum of
misfeasance amply justifies the conclusion that "DNA analysis
is... a human activity, subject to failures and insufficiencies and
mishaps and arrogance.45
A. False Positive Identificationsand High LaboratoryError
Rates
False positive identifications, that is, invalid matches of
DNA samples taken from the accused with samples purportedly
retrieved from the crime scene, are an emerging source of
erroneous convictions in sex offense cases. 46 Early evaluations of
DNA testing, both by commentators and in judicial opinions,
incorrectly suggested that false positives or misreadings were not
possible because "any defect in the sample or in the testing
procedures will result in a complete failure to produce any

See McDonald, supra note 6, at 356-57 ("DNA samples recovered from crime
143.
scenes are often so small and in such disintegrated condition that they are easy to
mishandle or manipulate.").
See Kris Axtman, Bungles in Texas Crime Lab Stir Doubt over DNA, CHRISTIAN
144.
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 18, 2003 (quoting Lawrence Goldman, president of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, who accused crime lab technicians of taking
"incredible shortcuts"), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0418/pO3sOl-usgn
.html.
Id.; see also JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE
145.
THE SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB 234 (1998) ("The truth was that DNA, the cutting
edge of biochemical genetics, the most sophisticated sci-crime weapon in history, was
useless when grafted onto crime labs that cannot even keep their glassware clean.");
Seidenberg, supra note 97 (reporting views of DNA expert and law professor Albert
Scherr that the estimated error rate in DNA testing is between one in fifty and one in a
thousand); Thompson, Actual Innocence, supra note 81 (discussing the numerous
occurrences of false positives both in proficiency tests and in real-life cases).
146. See Thompson, Actual Innocence, supra note 81 (discussing specific cases in
which retesting exposed errors in DNA analysis that led to erroneous convictions);
William C. Thompson et al., How the Probabilityof a False Positive Affects the Value of
DNA Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 47, 47 (2003).
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result."1 47 But more recent sources recognize that, although
mistakes are more likely to lead to false exclusions rather than
false matches, 48 lab error constitutes "'the most likely place to get
a false incrimination of an innocent person."" 9 There are at least
five explanations for a false positive DNA identification:' (a) the
real criminal had DNA matching the suspect's at the tested
loci;"' (b) forensic experts offered perjured or carelessly false
testimony; 52 (c) police failed "to properly consider the relevant

147.
Renskers, supra note 6, at 316; see Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (relying on expert testimony "that if there was something wrong with
the process, it would ordinarily lead to no result being obtained rather than an erroneous
result"); People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (County Ct. 1988) ("It is impossible
under the scientific principles, technology and procedures of DNA Fingerprinting (outside
of an identical twin), to get a 'false positive.'"), affd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992);
Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 903, 920-21 (1988) ("Environmental contamination, like an insufficient sample size,
produces unreadable, but not unreliable, results, and thus produces no identification at
all."); Evan Kanter et al., Analysis of Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms in
DeoxyribonucleicAcid (DNA) Recovered from Dried Bloodstains, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 403,
407 (1986) ("Erroneous results may be avoided with DNA analysis because degraded DNA
does not produce any bands on an autoradiograph.").
148.
NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 51.
149.
Rachel Nowak, Forensic DNA Goes to Court with O.J., 265 SCIENCE 1352, 1354
(1994) (quoting criminologist William Thompson); see Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The
Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35
JURIMETRICS J. 201, 213-15 (1995) (describing study finding that the introduction of
separate random match probabilities and laboratory error rates had "little impact" on
jurors' inclination to convict based on their perception of the statistics, suggesting a
relatively high potential for error); Eliot Marshall, Academy's About-Face on Forensic
DNA, 272 SCIENCE 803, 803 (1996) (citing experts who believe that the "odds of
lab[oratory] error... may be more significant than the odds of a chance DNA match");
Thompson et al., supra note 146, at 51 (describing the impact of false positive
identifications); see also Jonathan J. Koehler, Errorand Exaggeration in the Presentation
of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 23-24 & n.8 (1993) (listing examples of
misleading and inaccurate testimony by prosecution expert witnesses regarding the
reliability of DNA analysis).
The myth of "no false positives in DNA testing" appears to be an example of
expectations trampling truth, as lab errors leading to false positives were in fact revealed
in the earliest proficiency tests of DNA profiling analysis. See Jennifer Mnookin,
Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 51 (2001)
(discussing the occurrence of false positives at one laboratory, Cellmark, during early
proficiency tests). As Professor Mnookin concludes after reviewing such evidence, "Instead
of being inherently impossible, false positives turn out to be a fact of life." Id.
150.
See Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC 1I, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 439, 444 (1997) (listing potential causes for erroneous positive matches).
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 464-65 (expressing concern that analysts may be influenced by knowledge
of the crime, inducing "carelessness or even corruption"); Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look
Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring DNA Test Problems, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 22, 2004, at Al, http://bioforensics.com/news/DNA testing-prob
lems_7-04.html (observing that a false positive match is "'a classic error that reflects a
bias on the part of the analyst wanting to make a match'" (quoting forensic scientist and
crime lab auditor Janine Arvizu)).
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suspect pool";"6 3 (d) the laboratory erred in labeling or analyzing
the DNA samples; 5 4 or (e) the police intentionally or accidentally
contaminated or planted evidence.
DNA evidence "is only as good as the investigative and
'6
laboratory work that produces it."" The literature on forensic
analysis is suffused with incidents of high error rates in
15
7 leading one researcher to conclude that
proficiency testing,
8
"forensic lab performance is dangerously unreliable."" One
component of this unsatisfactory track record consists of the
generally poor training and minimal educational requirements of
forensic analysts."9 In the view of Stephen B. Bright, director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, "'So many of the people
who give DNA testimony ... went to two weeks of training by the
F.B.I. in Quantico... and they are miraculously transformed
from beat policemen into forensic scientists."..'

Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 1001 n.134.
153.
See Koehler et al., supra note 149, at 203 n.7 ("'[Liaboratory error' includes all
154.
relevant human and technical errors. These include: mislabelings, misrecordings,
errors.").
misrepresentations, case mix-ups, contaminations, and various interpretative
Lempert, supra note 150, at 444.
155.
at
Eric A. Fischer, DNA Ready to Clear,Implicate, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 8, 1996,
156.
Council
Research
National
the
at
Biology
on
Board
the
of
Director
was
5B. Mr. Fischer
NRC's
(NRC) in Washington, D.C. and served as the Director of Studies for the
The
Printing:
DNA
Pearsall,
Anthony
also
see
Id.;
Science.
Forensic
DNA
Committee on
Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CAL. L. REV. 665, 672 (1989) ("[V]alidation
becomes
alone will not solve the problem. Any test, no matter how thoroughly validated,
persist long
unreliable when performed unreliably. Concern about test conditions will
undermines the
after questions of basic reliability have been laid to rest, because misuse
dependability of even sound technology.").
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation
157.
Cause of
for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Erroras a
of a
evidence
"mounting
(describing
(1991)
22
19,
L.Q.
U.
WASH.
Forensic Misanalysis,69
Forensic
significant margin of error in scientific analysis"); Randolph N. Jonakait,
that
Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 109 (1991) (concluding
.poor quality pervades forensic science"). In the field of genetics, proficiency testing
is designed to ascertain whether an analyst can correctly determine genetic
types in a sample the origin of which is unknown to the analyst but is known to
a tester. Proficiency is demonstrated by making correct genetic typing
determinations in repeated trials, and not by opining on whether the sample
originated from a particular individual. Proficiency tests also require
laboratories to report random-match probabilities to determine if proper
calculations are being made.
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 459 n.251.
Jonakait, supra note 157, at 117-18; see also William C. Thompson, Accepting
158.
DNA
Lower Standards: The National Research Council's Second Report on Forensic
of error in
Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 407-17 (1997) (suggesting various sources
analyzing and interpreting DNA evidence and results).
Jonakait, supra note 157, at 124.
159.
Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2 (quoting Stephen
160.
B. Bright).
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The lack of certification or license requirements in the
profession has also been cited to explain the shoddy performance
of forensic laboratories.'
Forensic investigators have not
developed general, national standards to assure competency. 6 2
Sixty percent of the nation's crime labs, including those in New
York City and Los Angeles, have not met the minimum
accreditation standards of a voluntary association such as the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors.163 Nor are
forensic evaluators subject to any regulatory body that sets
6
standards and oversee quality performance. 1
Protocols and quality control measures are essential to
accurate scientific analysis.16 ' Yet forensic analysts not only
frequently fail to adhere to established protocols, 6 but also
generally lack "meaningful quality control programs."'67 Mistakes
in sample collection and handling can occur when investigators
mislabel items of evidence or do not follow strict chain-of-custody
formalities. 66 Such errors may result in a laboratory testing the
wrong sample, yielding incorrect results and perhaps even false
matches.'69 The National Research Council has recommended
that collection and handling errors be prevented through proper

161.
See Axtman, supra note 144 (reporting that the accreditation process remains
voluntary in most states). "Of the 400 to 500 labs doing forensic work nationwide,"
only
240 were accredited as of 2003; moreover, the accreditation process takes "time,
effort,
and plenty of money. Just preparing for it is often a three-year process." Id.
162.
See Jonakait, supra note 157, at 129.
163.
Crime Labs Get Ignored and Criminals Go Free, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 1996, at
12A. The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) has established
the
Crime Laboratory Accreditation Program as a "voluntary program in which any
crime
laboratory may participate to demonstrate that its management, personnel, operational
and technical procedures, equipment and physical facilities meet established standards."
See Am. Soc'y of Crime Lab. Dirs/Lab. Accreditation Bd., About ASCLD/LAB,
at
http://www.aseld-lab.org/dualaslabdualaboutascldlab.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2004)
(describing the ASCLD's Laboratory Accreditation Board).
164.
See McDonald, supra note 6, at 357 (calling for Congress to create a national
independent regulatory commission to "develop and implement strict standards
for
handling and testing DNA evidence").
165.
See Jonakait, supra note 157, at 156 ("Like good recipes, good protocols are
tested procedures that, if followed, assure that the desired results are most likely
to
occur.").
166.
See id. at 156-57 (noting the practice in many forensic labs of not requiring the
analyst to have or heed any printed protocol, or even to respect any instructions
or
warnings). "An absence of tested protocols means that crime lab analysts are
left to
determine for themselves what modifications in established procedures or what
new
procedures will best fit their abilities, their equipment, and the evidence." Id. at 157-58.
167.
Id. at 154; see McDonald, supra note 6, at 354-55 ("Current medical standards
for diagnosing strep throat are more stringent than those for forensic laboratories testing
DNA in criminal trials where lives hang in the balance.").
168.
See NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 80-81.
169.
Id. at 80.
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training, strict observation of handling procedures, "second
reading" reviews," ' and sample retesting.''
The retesting of genetic samples is perhaps the most-cited
primary measure forensic labs should take in the effort to avoid
1
both false positives and erroneous exclusions. 7' The opportunity
to retest a DNA sample is considered one of the guarantees
7
against a false charge involving genetic proof. As one federal
court has stated, "'[A] wrongly accused person's best insurance
against the possibility of being falsely incriminated is the
74 "Forensic
opportunity to have the testing repeated."
laboratories have a professional responsibility to preserve
7
retained evidence so as to minimize degradation.' ' To ensure
the reliability of DNA analysis, scientific protocols call for
splitting a sample before testing, whenever possible, so that
another forensic examiner can replicate the analysis.'
Contamination of DNA samples can also lead to erroneous
results.'7 Other human biological material may act as a source of
contamination. This occurs when investigators accidentally
introduce their own genetic material into the sample or when the
sample itself is mixed during the commission of the crime or
17
during sloppy handling by the forensic analyst. Contamination
In a "second reading," a second person reviews the results and analyzes them
170.
for potential errors. Id. at 81.
Id.
171.
See id. at 87-88 ("The best protection that an innocent suspect has against an
172.
error that could lead to a false conviction is the opportunity for an independent retest.");
Bieber, supra note 114, at 1089 (suggesting that the proper preservation of genetic
evidence for independent testing ensures defendants the opportunity to challenge
accuracy); Diehl, supra note 7, at 440 (advocating splitting specimens for retesting to
protect defendants from possible laboratory error); David H. Kaye & Edward
Imwinkelried, Forensic DNA Typing: Selected Legal Issues, A Report to the Working
part
Group on Legal Issues, National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence,
2
-000202
http.]homepages.law.asu.edu/-kayed/pubs/dna/ncfdna-report
at
(d),
II.A.2.(c),
.htm (Feb. 2, 2000) (noting that "a scientist who truly doubted the accuracy of the analysis
normally would have retested the samples to resolve the matter [, ilnasmuch as
replication is a crucial and common feature of scientific inquiry").
See NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 88.
173.
United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 416 (D. Mass. 1996) (quoting NRC,
174.
UPDATE, supra note 74, at 3-11), affd, 145 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1998).
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-2.5.2, at 716 n.109.
175.
See id. at 716 ("[L]aboratories must retain, when feasible, portions of the crime176.
scene samples and extracts to allow reanalysis.'); NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 87
(recommending that an independent laboratory retest the sample).
See NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 82-84 (stating that contamination, which
177.
occurs when a sample is mixed with a foreign material or substance, can result in test
failures and false matches).
See id. at 83-84 (noting that both extraneous evidence collected from the
178.
background environment and sample handling by various people can result in inadvertent
contamination). The classic example of a "mixed" sample is the vaginal swab taken from a
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by extraneous human genetic material can lead to DNA typing
errors, which may produce false results.'79 As with handling
errors, false results because of contamination can be minimized
through rigorous adherence to protocols. 8 Other types of
mistakes include laboratory sample analysis errors,'8 1 carryover
contamination,"' and malfunctioning equipment or improper
techniques.'8 3 The frequency of errors may be reduced if forensic
labs apply strict quality control procedures to the collection,
handling, laboratory analysis, and case review of DNA
evidence."
Another major problem associated with the availability of
accurate DNA technology, which is needed to solve sexual
assaults and other violent crimes, is the current extensive
nationwide backlog of untested DNA samples.'85 In response to
the backlog, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 to provide states with federal grants to
carry out DNA analyses that will be entered into the Combined
DNA Index System ("CODIS"), a DNA information bank operated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).'86 In a 2001 study,
rape victim that contains both semen and vaginal secretions. Id. at 84. Similarly, a
sample may be mixed if there are multiple assailants or if the victim engages in
consensual sexual activity prior to the attack. See, e.g., Cynthia Bryant, When One Man's
DNA Is Another Man's Exonerating Evidence: Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of
Rape Victims to Provide DNA Samples to Postconviction Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 113, 115 (2000) (noting the possibility that sperm found on a vaginal swab
could have resulted from consensual sex with another partner "around the time of the
rape"); Hibbert, supra note 75, at 803 (observing that the higher frequency of error in
forensic DNA analysis, as compared to medical DNA analysis, is partially due to DNA
artifacts that are "degraded, highly contaminated, or even 'mixtures of samples from
different individuals, as happens in a multiple rape'").
179.
NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 83.
180.
See id.
181.
See Hibbert, supra note 75, at 803 (emphasizing that even "pristine" crime scene
artifacts can result in a faulty profile if they are improperly analyzed in the forensics
laboratory).
182.
NRC, UPDATE, supra note 74, at 84 (explaining that carryover contamination
occurs when the substance used to amplify the DNA is introduced before the DNA sample
is completely isolated, resulting in the amplification of not only the target sample but also
the contaminant).
183.
Id. at 82.
184.
Id. at 87.
185.
ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/j ustice/dna initiative-policy-book pdf.
186.
42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2000). The legislation also provided that DNA analyses so
funded would be "carried out in a laboratory that satisfies quality assurance standards."
§ 14135(d)(1). The law also provided for forced extraction of DNA samples from specified
federal prisoners, parolees, and probationers. § 14135(a)(1)-(2). This portion of the law
was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Kincade, 354 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2003),
on the ground that the intrusive nature of the compelled collection, in the absence of
individualized reasonable suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure
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the Bureau of Justice Statistics found "that between 1997 and
in casework
2000, DNA laboratories experienced a 73% increase
8 ' The National
and a 135% increase in their casework backlogs."
Institute of Justice estimated in 2003 that as many as 350,000
DNA samples remain unexamined in homicide and rape cases
nationwide.' In addition, state crime labs are also inundated by
the rapidly increasing number of convicted offender DNA
samples.18 s The National Institute of Justice has estimated that
"the number of collected, untested convicted offender samples is
between 200,000 and 300,000," with an additional 500,0009 to one
million such samples "owed, but not yet collected." ' The
President's 2003 DNA initiative acknowledged that public crime
laboratories are frequently "overwhelmed by backlogs of
unanalyzed DNA samples," and that "these labs may be illequipped to handle the increasing influx of DNA samples and
evidence." 9
Many samples remain untested for years because of the
that the
sheer inability of state laboratories to meet the demands
92
large volume of DNA evidence places on them.' Resolving the
DNA sample backlog poses immense financial and personnel
problems.'9 3 "Without an increase in funding, crime labs may
continue to represent overcrowded warehouses of potentially
94
contaminated evidence."' More genetic samples are collected
realigned itself
clause. Id. at 1113. In a subsequent rehearing, however, the Ninth Circuit
profiling of
DNA
"compulsory
the
that
holding
with other state and federal courts,
satisfies the
qualified federal offenders is reasonable" and that the "DNA Act
F.3d 813, 839-40
requirements of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Kincade, 379
(9th Cir. 2004).
ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 185, at 3.
187.
188. Id.
See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
189.
NIJ REPORT].
GENERAL ON DELAYS IN FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 7-8 (2003) [hereinafter
185, at 3. The
note
supra
TECHNOLOGY,
DNA
THROUGH
ADVANCING JUSTICE
190.
both types of
report also noted that the FBI's laboratory has small backlogs in analyzing
Id.
samples.
DNA
Id. at 2.
191.
a
Hibbert, supra note 75, at 799; see also NIJ Report, supra note 189, at 2 (citing
192.
"significant backlog" of DNA samples caused by increased demand for DNA analyses
"without a corresponding growth in forensic laboratory capacity"); Christopher H. Asplen,
the Criminal Justice
From Crime Scene to Courtroom: Integrating DNA Technology into
face a
System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146-48 (1999) (estimating that forensic laboratories
samples).
CODIS
unanalyzed
million
1.3
of
six-year backlog
Genetic
See Eric Slater, Rape Case DNA Tests the Limits: Milwaukee Uses
193.
by
Overwhelmed
Is
Databank
National
Crimes:
Evidence to File Warrants in Unsolved
2000, at Al
Samples, Underfunded and Undercoordinated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
Morgan, supra
(describing lack of funding for state forensic laboratories); see also Tracy &
to most law
note 76, at 654-55 (arguing that the scarcity of resources available
tool).
crime-fighting
a
as
use
DNA's
limits
enforcement agencies severely
799
McDonald, supra note 6, at 358-59; see also Hibbert, supra note 75, at
194.
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and deposited into state laboratories every day, although lack of
funding has put the states behind in processing samples they
already have.195 In an effort to address the issue, in 2003 the
Bush Administration proposed a budget of one billion dollars
over the next five years to eliminate the national DNA backlog,
improve the quality of crime labs, and provide DNA-use training
for law enforcement personnel in the criminal justice system. 196
The vast majority of crime labs are staffed and funded by
state governments.'9 7 The pressure of high DNA backlogs
accentuates the normal job bias affecting many forensic analysts:
One of the problems that forensics experts cite with
labs run by police departments is that they lack
independence. The technicians who work in such labs can
come to see themselves not as neutral fact-finders, but as
"police in lab coats," as one knowledgeable
source put it,
whose aims are aligned with police investigators intent on
pinning a crime on a suspect. 19s
(noting that many DNA samples remain untested for years because state labs
are unable
to meet the demands that the large volume of DNA evidence places upon them);
Joyce
Purnick, DNA Evidence Offers Hope, and Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2000, at BI
(reporting on the plethora of unanalyzed rape kits around the country and the
paucity of
money to pay for the tests and available laboratories to perform them). In one
egregious
incident, a Houston criminal court judge halted a capital murder trial in April
2003 when
he discovered that a DNA lab hired by the city "[had] refused to analyze all
the evidence
requested by lawyers on both sides because money from the city [was] running
out." Lisa
Teachey et al., Murder Trial Hits Snag Over Lab Money Dispute, Hous. CHRON.,
Apr. 17,
2003, at Al.
195.
See Aveson, supra note 115 (describing the forensic lab predicament in New
York State); see also Editorial, DNA Evidence Is Boon to Police, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr.
27, 2002, at 14A ("Across the country, police labs are backed up and the greatest
advance
in the criminal justice system is a prisoner to the passage of time and the availability
of
resources."); Carlos Sadovi, DNA Taken After Rapes Sits Untested; State Crime
Lab Can't
Keep Up with Backlog Dating to 2000, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2003 (describing more
than 1000
Chicago rape kits 'languish[ing]" in police vaults, leading several women to
try to raise
private funds to have the evidence tested) available at 2003 WL 69402710.
196. ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 185, at ii; see
Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003, S. 1828, 108th Cong.
(2003)
(currently referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
197.
See NIJ REPORT, supra note 189, at 2 (arguing that the shortage of trained
scientists and personnel in state and local crime labs is partially due to the
shrinking
budgets of state and local governments); M.A. Thompson, Bias and Quality
Control in
Forensic Science: A Cause for Concern, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 504, 509 (1974)
[hereinafter
Thompson, Bias and Quality Control] (noting that a preponderance of forensic
labs are
located within and are closely aligned with the law enforcement branches of the
states).
198.
Testing Questions; HPD Crime Lab Measures Not Instilling Confidence, HOUS.
CHRON., Feb. 4, 2003, at A40. The issue of bias in state-run crime labs is a
longstanding
and unresolved one. See, e.g., Thompson, Bias and Quality Control supra
note 197, at
509-10.
[Tihe preponderance of well-qualified forensic laboratories are located with
the
resources of the State.... They work hand in hand with the police from
the
beginning of an investigation .... Is the [expert] witness who has his job and
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The conclusion that forensic evaluators favor the prosecution
is neither of recent vintage nor at all surprising. Forensic
analysis "grew up in the criminal law. The exigencies imposed on
it by police and prosecutors molded it into its contemporary
shape."'99 Proprosecution bias is evident at every stage of the
forensic process .2°0 Evidentiary material is generally presented to
the analyst "in a needlessly suggestive manner," accompanied by
police memos indicating the rationale for suspecting the guilt of a
particular suspect.20 1 The expectation that the crime lab will
cooperate with the investigation is often explicitly conveyed:
"[H]eads of [police] crime labs [sometimes] [report] that
they have been told to find a certain result. Now that's not
strange, because the loyalty of the scientist is not to science
he
there; it's to his job. If he wants
20 2to be loyal to science,
better get a job somewhere else."
Given the "understandable prosecutorial orientation" of
many forensic evaluators, the risk of skewed judgment and
results is great. 2 " This bias favoring conviction of targeted
both by defense 24 and by law
suspects is acknowledged
05
as well as by forensic analysts
enforcement sources,

salary controlled by the State completely free from pressure, conscious or
unconscious, to be entirely impartial?
Id.
Saks, supra note 82, at 1091. The milieu of a crime lab dictates the operant
199.
norms in terms of the result sought. See David Johnston & Andrew C. Revkin, Report
at
Finds F.B.I. Lab Slipping From Pinnacle of Crime Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997,
by
run
operation
an
in
stifled
often
were
they
said
laboratory
the
at
("Scientists
Al
nontechnical field agents who had little knowledge of science and who regularly altered
reports to help prosecutors.").
See Jonakait, supra note 157, at 160-62 (observing that the suggestive manner
200.
in which evidence is presented to forensic scientists by the police, along with the natural
"prosecutorial orientation of many scientists," results in examiners who might
unconsciously believe the suspect is guilty and thus could arguably "skew subjective
judgments" throughout the forensic process).
Id. at 160.
201.
See Michaud, supra note 86, at 70 (second and third alterations in original)
202.
(quoting Professor Oliver C. Schroeder).
Jonakait, supra note 157, at 161.
203.
See Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, DNA Find Sparks Call For Review: New
204.
Look at Policies in DA's Office Urged, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2003, at All ("One of the
biggest problems of the Houston crime lab is that they were much more concerned with
being a servant to the police and prosecutors than they were to science." (quoting attorney
Peter Neufeld of the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New
York)).
See Roma Khanna, HPD Chief Proposes Independently Run Crime Lab, HOUS.
205.
CHRON., Apr. 3, 2003, at Al ("Should a complex evidence, like DNA, be presented solely
by the prosecution or should it be processed by a neutral entity that is not employed by
either side?" (quoting Houston Police Chief C.O. Bradford)).
Private labs, operating under contracts with states and municipalities, similarly
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themselves." 6 At the far end of this bias spectrum, forensic
testimony has often involved perjury and fraud committed by
investigators seeking illicit convictions.0 7
B. A Case Study: The Houston, Texas DNA Lab
The crime laboratory in Houston, Texas, the fourth-largest
city in the United States,0 8 provides one conspicuous example of
incompetence and corruption in DNA testing. The importance of
this laboratory is highlighted by its location as the source for
DNA testing for Harris County, Texas, the county with the
highest death penalty conviction rate in the nation,0 9 "where an
aggressive district attorney's office has sent more people to the
210
death chamber than all but two states."

court allegations of proprosecution bias. See Editorial, Testing Questions: HPD Crime Lab
Measures Not Instilling Confidence, HOus. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2003, at A40 (reporting
claims of a "dangerous conflict of interest" when a private firm, Identigene, received an
interim contract to perform DNA testing for the Houston Police Department (HPD) while
the company was competing for a long-term contract). "With an economic interest at
stake, Identigene workers similarly could see their role as backing up police suspicions
with scientific evidence to help investigators make their cases and help Identigene win a
lucrative HPD contract." Id.; see also Joseph P. Fried, Prosecutors Move to Give DNA
Evidence in Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1988, at B3 ("You are relying on one group of
people [(expert witnesses supplied by Lifecodes Corporation)] who are guns for hire, who
are paid to testify." (quoting defense attorney Kerry J. Katsorhis, challenging the
reliability of DNA evidence in a New York rape case)).
206.
See Glen Martin, Grand Jury's Stinging Denouncement of S.F. Crime Labs:
Report Cites Small Staffs, Old Equipment, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 1996, at A19 (reporting
opposition of San Francisco Crime Lab Chief Frank Norris to transfer of authority to the
district attorney's office). In Norris's experience, prosecutors "sometimes try to exert too
much pressure on the labs .... They can lose their objectivity, because they want to
convict." Id.
207.
See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997)
(discussing recent cases in which forensic scientists perjured themselves, faked laboratory
reports, or both).
208.
MARC J. PERRY & PAUL J. MACKUN, US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POPULATION CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION 1990 TO 2000, at 7 (Apr. 2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubstc2kbrOl-2.pdf
209.
See Adam Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in
Texas Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 [hereinafter Liptak, Houston
DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist] ('More defendants from Harris County, of which
Houston is a part, have been executed than from any other county in the country.").
210.
Lianne Hart, Labs Woes Cast Doubt on 68 Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2003, at A19. The inmates for whom retesting was ordered in the wake of the Houston lab
imbroglio included seventeen on death row. Id.; see also Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker,
Fingers Pointed at HPD Crime Lab in Death Row Case, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 24, 2003, at
Al ("Attorneys for a death row inmate believe problems at the Houston Police
Department crime lab may be the reason their client never received evidence that could
have cleared him before trial.").
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An independent audit by the Texas Department of Safety in
21
December 2002 exposed widespread problems at the laboratory. '
"Analysts botched simple tests. They misinterpreted data. They
stored evidence in a room where the ceiling leaked so badly that,
212
one stormy night, 34 DNA samples were destroyed." The audit
described "a host of problems with [the lab's] methods, including
poor calibration and maintenance of equipment, improper record
keeping and a lack of safeguards against contamination of
21 The crime lab's DNA section was shut down and a
samples.""
214
review ordered for hundreds of convictions. The DNA testing
chief, Jim Bolding, "defended his eight-person staff, describing
them as overworked and under-funded."" 5 Bolding then stated,
"We do not have sufficient funding, staff or wherewithal to do the
216
amount of work that has come into the crime laboratory." The
crime lab's chief, Donald R. Krueger, stated that although he
believed a DNA training manual existed at the lab, he was not
positive. 7 Although internal audits of the crime lab were
See Roma Khanna et al., DA Rejects Judges' Request for Recusal from Lab
211.
Probe, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 12, 2003, at Al (reporting findings that "the lab examiners
were insufficiently trained, equipment was not maintained and the roof leaked,
jeopardizing evidence"); Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, House Hearings on HPD Crime
Lab to Focus on Audit, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2003, at A15 [hereinafter McVicker &
Khanna, House Hearings on HPD Lab] (describing the organization as "a crime lab from
hell," with the audit exposing shortcomings in "lab personnel, handling of evidence,
scientific technique, facilities and equipment"). A 2003 investigation conducted by the
Houston Chronicle found that none of the DNA lab analysts were "qualified by education
and training" to perform the job, "based on national standards and a... review of their
personnel files." Lise Olsen & Roma Khanna, DNA Lab Analysts Unqualified: Review
Finds Education,TrainingLacking, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2003, at Al.
Hart, supra note 210.
212.
Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny,
213.
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at 20. The audit reported that the DNA lab staff failed to follow
the "written procedures for calibrating equipment in the lab area." Mike Glenn, Auditors
Find Problem with HPD's Crime Lab: Evidence of DNA Contamination Cited, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 23, 2003, at A19. The inspection team found no logs documenting equipment
repair and calibration prior to use in casework analysis and no documentation of steps
taken to clean the equipment and work areas. Id. The auditors were told by lab analysts
that budget concerns limited the calibration of the equipment. Id.
See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, DA May Get Last Say on Lab Inquiry:
214.
Court of Inquiry Only Option to Grand Jury, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2003, at A23; Steve
McVicker & Roma Khanna, DNA Lab Questions Multiply: Cases in Four Other Counties
Had Evidence Tested at Facility,HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2003, at A29.
Hart, supra note 210.
215.
Id. Mr. Bolding's own DNA analysis and testimony in criminal cases have come
216.
under fire. See Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Lab Chiefs Testimony in 3 Cases
Questioned: Court Transcripts Show HPD Work Was Wrong, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 29,
2003, at A37 [hereinafter McVicker & Khanna, Lab Chiefs Testimony in 3 Cases
Questioned] ('The head of the DNA division of the Houston Police Department's crime lab
has offered testimony in at least three cases that has later turned out to be wrong,
according to court transcripts.").
Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Crime Lab Chief Reveals Failings:In Internal
217.
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mandatory, the crime lab head stated that they "have not been
performed
in the last several years; we simply have not had that
218
luxury."

The training and qualifications of the forensic analysts at
the lab were examined in the audit, which found that one DNA
"technical manager" had not studied statistics or population
genetics. 2 9 The audit team's task was made more difficult
because of the DNA lab's failure to "'maintain records on the
relevant qualifications, training skills and experience of all
technical personnel.' 22
After the team questioned the
qualifications of four lab analysts and the continuing education of
all employees, it concluded that the examiners failed to meet the
educational requirements recommended by the FBI.2 21 The
auditors "could not find transcripts to determine if two [of the
DNA examiners] had received undergraduate degrees or if two
other examiners had studied biochemistry, genetics and
molecular biology. 22 2 All the DNA analysts had failed to attend at
least "one training session on a matter related to their work in
the last year."223 Testifying for the prosecution in a June 2002
sexual assault trial, the Houston DNA lab chief told the jury that
his credentials included a doctorate in biochemistry from the
University of Texas when in fact he had been academically
dismissed before completing his degree. 224 Finally, the city's police
chief admitted that the crime lab director was not "properly
credentialed" and did not have a background in DNA testing.225
The malaise and malfeasance at the Houston lab were
staggering. In addition to the ceiling leak "'need[ing] immediate
Papers, Director Described Ongoing Problems, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2003, at A17
[hereinafter McVicker & Khanna, Crime Lab Chief Reveals Failings] ("'The training
manuals were one of the budget items developed .... To my knowledge the [DNA lab] had
such a manual; or at least that is what everyone thought.'" (second alteration in original)
(quoting Donald R. Krueger, former crime lab chief)).
218.
McVicker & Khanna, Crime Lab ChiefReveals Failings,supra note 217 (quoting
Donald R. Krueger, former crime lab chief).
219.
McVicker & Khanna, House Hearingson HPD Lab, supra note 211.
220.
Id. (quoting the audit report).
221.
Id.
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Roma Khanna & Lise Olsen, CredentialsEmbellished: Transcript:Ex-Lab Chief
Told Jury He Had a Ph.D., Hous. CHRON., Sept. 10, 2003, at A17.
225.
Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, D.A. Is Asked to Back Call for HPD Lab
Probe:Rosent4al Cool to Resolution Seeking FBIReview of Cases, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 14,
2003, at A33. The Houston District Attorney admitted that the DNA lab "paid 'low
salaries'" and had "'been hiring people for years with simple biology degrees who have no
(DNA) training.'" Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Bradford Knew of DNA Lab Problem:
DA Denies Claim He, Too, Was Aware of PoorConditions, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26, 2003, at
Al [hereinafter Khanna & McVicker, Bradford Knew of DNA Lab Problem].
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attention,"' auditors found that DNA "'cuttings and extracts in
the storage freezers [were] not properly sealed."'2 26 Criminology
professor and former DNA analyst Richard Li explained, "'The
sealing of evidence after cutting is part of a chain of custody that
is a very important concept in forensic science."' 27 Professor Li
suggested that "such breaches could be indicative of more serious
problems at the lab."22 Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, a DNA expert who
once headed the Houston lab, also evaluated the current
analysts' work: "Every single case I ever reviewed of theirs had at
one error."229
least one serious error-and sometimes more than
Dr. Johnson noted that the analysts were particularly deficient
in "extracting DNA from mixed sources," such as separating
vaginal cells from sperm cells: "No one seem[ed] to be able to
grasp how to do this correctly."2 ' "In one rape case,. . . a
technician testified that a swab of the victim found semen, even
though initial lab reports said there was no semen present."231 In
other cases, Dr. Johnson reported that evidence that technicians
232
had found "inconclusive actually exonerated the defendants."

intentional
and
incompetence
between
line
The
3 Dr. Johnson
3
2
misrepresentation was apparently often crossed.
concluded that crime lab analysts frequently would vastly
"exaggerate the probability of a defendant's guilt."2 34 She asserted

that, in their expert testimony in DNA cases, the lab technicians
McVicker & Khanna, House Hearingson HPD Lab, supra note 211 (quoting the
226.
audit report).
Id. Professor Li added that sealing the evidence was "very essential ... for
227.
preserving the integrity of the evidence." Id. The professional standards for preserving
biological evidence are instructive:
Samples (particularly those containing wet stains) should not be packaged
together, and samples should be dried or refrigerated as soon as possible.
Storage in the dry state and at low temperatures stabilizes biological material
against degradation.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-2.5.2, at 716 n.108.
McVicker & Khanna, House Hearings on HPD Lab, supra note 211. For
228.
example, the audit also found that the Houston "lab does not use proper controls to
monitor the precision of its procedures. One such control-the use of reagent blanks, a
commonly accepted method of ensuring that tested samples are not contaminated-was
routinely neglected .... " Id.
Hart, supra note 210.
229.
Id.
230.
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209.
231.
Id.
232.
See Thom Marshall, Quick Job Needed to Free Innocent, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 5,
233.
2003, at A31 ("A large enough volume of incompetence adds up to corruption.") (quoting
David Dow, a University of Houston law professor and director of the Texas Innocence
Network, indicating that he is reopening approximately "100 cases handled by the
network and involving convictions obtained through any type of evidence processed by the
[Houston crime] lab").
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209.
234.
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"intentionally mislead,... [a]nd in all the cases I've been
involved in [as a defense consultant], they always mislead in
favor of a conviction."" 5 Dr. William C. Thompson, a criminology
professor, "studied eight DNA cases processed by the Houston
[lab and] found 'serious shortcomings in all of them.'"236 Dr.
Thompson also noted that the "'likelihood that there are more
innocent people convicted because of bad lab work is almost
certain."'2 " In recent years, all Houston lab data was purged from
both state and federal databases, 3 8 and the FBI was even
considering terminating the lab's access to the national
database.23 9
In addition to personnel problems, the substandard physical
condition of the crime lab building could directly affect the
integrity of the DNA evidence tested and preserved there.2 40 "The
roof leakage problem can cause contamination and/or deleterious
change to the evidence....""' DNA degrades quickly when wet,
and rainwater can easily cause cross-contamination and loss of
DNA samples. 4' The dilapidated condition of the physical
structure was observed when the lab moved to its present
location in 1997.141 "'Upon relocation ...it was discovered that a
situation existed that allowed water to leak into the [DNA lab]
from areas outside the Crime Laboratory ....The potential
contamination caused by these conditions does not allow the

235.
See McVicker & Khanna, Lab Chiefs Testimony in 3 Cases Questioned, supra
note 216 (quoting Dr. Elizabeth Johnson).
236.
Madigan, supra note 213.
237.
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209; see Hart,
supra note 210 ("People have lost confidence in the criminal justice system here ....You
almost have a picture of the Keystone Kops, but it's not funny because you're dealing with
people's lives. There are bound to be people who are innocent and in jail." (quoting Texas
State Rep. Kevin Bailey, head of a legislative committee investigating problems at the
crime lab)).
238.
Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, All HPD Cases Will Be Purged from State,
U.S. DNA Databases,Hous. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2003, at Al.
239.
Steve McVicker et al., HPD Used DNA Database So Rarely that It Lost Access,
HOuS. CHRON., Mar. 19, 2003, at Al.
240.
See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Mayor Knew of Lab Woes: Others
Contradict Brown's Benign Assessment, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2003, at A21 [hereinafter
Khanna & McVicker, Mayor Knew of Lab Woes] (stating the opinion of a former Houston
lab analyst that the water leaks at the lab "compromised the integrity of biological
evidence stored in our facility").
241.
Id.
242.
See Khanna & McVicker, BradfordKnew of DNA Lab Problem, supra note 225
(noting that the leak "could cause DNA cross-contamination. DNA degrades rapidly in wet
conditions. To remoisten a sample is a good way to lose evidence." (quoting William
Thompson, a criminology professor who specializes in forensic science and who has
reviewed the Houston crime lab's work)).
243.
See McVicker & Khanna, Crime Lab ChiefReveals Failings,supra note 217.
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[DNA lab] to meet the minimum standards.., to minimize
contamination.' ' " An internal memo revealed a stopgap effort to
lessen the contamination problem in 2002, noting that workers
had "'installed large plastic funnels in the ceiling in areas [of the
DNA lab] that leak the worst.' 2 45 After receiving complaints from
lab employees, City Councilwoman Carol Alvarado toured the
facility in June 2002 and described the conditions she observed:
"'These were not just leaks; these were holes .... There were
trash buckets and water buckets throughout the lab. They were
having to move tables around, because some of the leaks were
occurring. ' 46
near and sometimes above where the analysis was
A photograph published in the Houston Chronicle showed the
"inside [of] the [Houston] crime lab on a rainy day. Ceiling tiles
missing. A wastebasket in the middle of the floor to catch a leak.
A yellow barricade to warn people so they won't slip on the
24 7

floor."

Nor were the lab's technical and procedural failings new. A
1996 audit had described the DNA lab's "'management by crisis,'
prioritizing cases for analysis only after '"eleventh hour"
notification that cases were set for trial.' 248 The lab's director
"played a 'virtually nonexistent' role in managing cases," and the
lab's documentation was described as "inadequate and so vague
that it 'precludes the lab from properly prioritizing cases and
conducting appropriate analyses.' 249 As in most states, no agency

Id. (second, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting DNA Division
244.
Chief Jim Bolding).
Id. (quoting then-lab director Donald R. Krueger in an interoffice memo).
245.
Karin Brulliard, Tex. Lawmakers Probe Lab over Reports of Tainted DNA
246.
Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2003, at A5 (quoting Carol Alvarado).
Thorn Marshall, Leaky Crime Lab Is Tip of Iceberg, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 28,
247.
2003, at A31. In her May 28, 2002 letter of resignation, Houston DNA analyst Jennifer
LaCross described the lab as inhospitable to science:
I feel that our laboratory is housed in a building that is more suited for
condemnation rather than a place where sensitive scientific procedures are
carried out ....
[The] leaking of water has forced the employees on the 26th floor [where
the DNA lab is located] to work in hazardous conditions. These hazardous
conditions include uncontainable puddles of water, water leaking on to electrical
wiring and lighting, and water leaking onto biological materials such as bloodsoaked items. This water containment problem has at times, in my opinion,
compromised the integrity of biological evidence stored in our facility.
Khanna & McVicker, Mayor Knew of Lab Woes, supra note 240 (second alteration in
original) (quoting letter of resignation from Jennifer Lacross to Houston Police
Department Assistant Chief M.C. Simmons (May 28, 2002)).
McVicker & Khanna, Crime Lab Chief Reveals Failings,supra note 217 (quoting
248.
the 1996 internal audit).
Id.
249.
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monitored the crime lab in Texas, and the state did not require
its labs to seek accreditation.251
As outlined earlier, perhaps the most significant protection
against DNA analyst error is the opportunity to retest the
sample.252 However, when DNA was processed by the Houston
crime lab, retesting was almost always impossible: "In most
cases, [the crime lab technicians] used up all available evidence,
barring defense experts from refuting or verifying their
results."2

3

The lab's "frequent practice of using up every scrap of

biological material" was carried out "either in clumsy attempts
assaying it or in criminal attempts at covering up
incompetence."254 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
imagine a more effective destruction of the ideal of providing the

250.
See Axtman, supra note 144 (reporting that the lab "accreditation process
remains voluntary in most states").
251.
See Roma Khanna, HPD Chief Proposes Independently Run Crime Lab, Hous.
CHRON., Apr. 3, 2003, at Al ("[Texas] does not require labs to seek national
accreditation."). The Texas legislature has recently taken the first steps toward a crime
lab accreditation program. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.0205(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004)
(providing for the establishment of "an accreditation process for crime laboratories,
including DNA laboratories, and other entities conducting forensic analyses of physical
evidence for use in criminal proceedings"); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.35(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2004) (providing that testimony regarding forensic analysis is inadmissible
"in a criminal case if, at the time of the analysis or the time the evidence is submitted to
the court, the crime laboratory or other entity conducting the analysis was not accredited
by the Department of Public Safety"). Despite the above criminal procedure provision,
testimony concerning forensic analyses conducted at an unaccredited laboratory is
admissible if the laboratory "has preserved one or more separate samples of the physical
evidence for use by the defense attorney or use under order of the convicting court."
§ 38.35(e)(1).
252.
Refer to notes 171-76 supra and accompanying text (discussing the need for
retesting of DNA samples to ensure reliability).
253.
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209; see also
Hart, supra note 210 (stating that the Houston lab's practice of using the entire DNA
sample during initial testing was contrary to industry standards).
254.
Editorial, A Separate Truth: HPD Crime Lab Disaster Demands Independent
Inquiry, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2003, at 2C; see also James Kimberly, HPD Appetite for
Evidence Assailed: Overconsumption Often Left Little DNA for Defense to Retest, HOUS.
CHRON., Apr. 8, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Kimberly, HPDAppetite for Evidence Assailed].
The Houston Police Department crime lab, in case after case, used up
more physical evidence than experts say was necessary to conduct DNA tests,
saving nothing for future tests that could exonerate or identify criminals.
The crime lab's practice long bothered defense lawyers, who said it forced
them to rely on the prosecution's evidence and put them at a disadvantage in
criminal trials. With the reliability of the lab's work now under scrutiny, the
lab's practice is even more troubling.
The overconsumption of evidence has prevented people accused of sexual
assault from conducting their own tests to see if the physical evidence supports
their version of events rather than their accuser's.
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accused with a fair trial than a case in which identification is
proven by DNA evidence.255
C. Convicted by a "FalsePositive"
The bizarre and sad saga of Josiah Sutton illustrates the
perils of considering DNA in the abstract without regard to the
gritty realities of contravening evidence.256 Unlike many of the
defendants exonerated by the Innocence Project and related
efforts that relied on DNA analysis to overturn convictions
obtained in the pre-DNA era, Josiah Sutton was both convicted
and then vindicated by DNA."' His case thus provides a window
into an emerging second generation of DNA litigation,
encompassing cases in which erroneous results are the product of
corrupt genetic testing, evidence preservation, and expert
testimony. 259
Josiah Sutton's case began on October 25, 1998, when
Priscilla Stewart reported to police that she had been taken in
her car from her. Houston apartment complex at gunpoint and
raped by two young black males who then dumped her in a
field. 6° Stewart claimed that her rapists were each about five
See id. ("We're of an opinion on the defense bar that someone ... suggested to
255.
them to destroy the evidence so we couldn't retest .... I've never had a case from the
[Houston] lab where they saved anything for resampling. The only thing I had to review
was their notes.'" (first alteration in original) (quoting Houston defense attorney James
Stafford)).
See William C. Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence in State of Texas v. Josiah
256.
Sutton (Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence] (detailing the
facts surrounding Sutton's conviction based on wrongly analyzed DNA evidence),
http://www.scientific.org/archiveifhompson%2OReport.PDF.
See generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
257.
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (describing the work of
the Innocence Project).
See Roma Khanna & Alan Bernstein, Joyous Sutton Tastes Freedom, HOUS.
258.
CHRON., Mar. 13. 2003, at Al (reporting details of Sutton's rape conviction based on faulty
DNA evidence testimony from the Houston crime lab and Sutton's subsequent release
from prison after independent DNA testing confirmed his innocence).
See Thompson et al., supra note 146, at 47-54 (detailing recent cases involving
259.
false DNA identifications because of sample-switching errors, misinterpretation of test
results, and false positives).
Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence, supra note 256, at 2. The facts of the
260.
Sutton case discussed in this Article are also distilled from the following sources: Sutton
v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (affirming the denial of Sutton's
motion for a new trial); Roma Khanna, DNA from Conviction of Teen Will Be Retested:
1999 Rape Case Part of HPD Crime Lab Review, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2003, at A33
[hereinafter Khanna, DNA from Conviction of Teen Will Be Retested]; Roma Khanna,
Taking Back the Life Lost, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2003, at Al; Roma Khanna & Steve
McVicker, Shoddy Lab Work May Free Convict: New DNA Test Casts Doubt on Man's
1999 Rape Conviction, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2003 [hereinafter Khanna & McVicker,

1250

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:4

feet, seven inches tall.261 She described one as weighing
approximately 120 pounds and wearing a skull cap during the
incident.262 She described the other as weighing about 135 pounds
and wearing a baseball cap with the bill turned toward the
side. 63 Five days after the attack, she noticed three black males
walking in the vicinity of her apartment.26 4 One of these men,
Gregory Adams, wore a skull cap; another, Josiah Sutton, wore a
baseball cap with the bill turned to the side. 65 Stewart identified
Adams as one of her attackers, remarking on his distinctive
walk, which she recalled from the incident. 66 She identified
Sutton as the other rapist, even though Sutton is six feet, onehalf inch tall and at the time weighed more than 200 pounds.267
Adams

and

Sutton were arrested. 28

After DNA tests

conducted by the Houston crime lab excluded Adams, the state
dismissed the case against him and prosecuted Sutton for the

rape. 269 The prosecution

discounted

both the complainant's

erroneous identification of Adams and her markedly inaccurate
description of Sutton, relying instead on the genetic proof
purportedly establishing that Sutton's DNA profile could be
"'expected to occur in 1 out of 694,000 people among the black
population.
At trial in July 1999,271 "the only evidence offered against
Sutton was the complainant's eyewitness identification and the
DNA test results." 72 The jury convicted Sutton of aggravated

sexual assault, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in

Shoddy Lab Work May Free Convict], available at http://www.chron.comcs/CDA/print
story.mpllspecial/crimelab/1812821; Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Sutton Freed
Because of Faulty DNA Evidence in Rape Case, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 15, 2003, availableat
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/special/crimelab/1815633; Kimberly, HPD
Appetite for Evidence Assailed, supra note 254; Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears
Convicted Rapist, supra note 209; Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof, supra
note 2; Madigan, supra note 213.
261.
Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence, supra note 256, at 2.
262.
Id.
263.
Id.
264.
Id. at 2-3.
265.
Id. at 3.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Id.
270.
Id. (quoting the Houston Police Department's Serology/DNA Unit report). "The
[crime lab] analyst who testified in Mr. Sutton's case said she had attended a two-week
training course sponsored by the company that sold DNA kits to her laboratory." Liptak,
You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2.
271.
Khanna and McVicker, Shoddy Lab Work May Free Convict, supra note 260.
272.
Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence, supra note 256, at 3.
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prison.273 Sutton filed a motion for a new trial, principally
claiming that his trial attorney had provided him with ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to obtain an independent DNA
test. 274 At a hearing on that motion, trial counsel testified that he
did not obtain the second test for two reasons: (1) Sutton's family
did not provide him with the funds needed to pay for the forensic
analysis, and (2) such retesting was impossible because no
unadulterated samples of the crime scene DNA remained after
75
the Houston crime lab completed its testing. Although a DNA
lab technician contradicted the attorney's testimony by asserting
that there were indeed unadulterated samples remaining for
testing, the trial court denied appellant's motion for new trial,
276
and the court of appeals affirmed.
After a Houston television station contacted an independent
forensic expert, the Sutton case began to take on an entirely new
complexion.277 This private investigation and reexamination
revealed that at Sutton's trial, the DNA test results "were
presented to the jury in a misleading manner that greatly
overstated their value."278 After testifying about the uniqueness of
human DNA, the forensic technician told the jury that Sutton's
DNA pattern was found in three different samples obtained from
the scene. 2 9 Because the jurors were given no statistical
elaboration of these findings, they "could reasonably have
concluded ... that Sutton was uniquely identified as a semen
donor." 28 In fact, the probability of a coincident match to one of
See Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Retests of DNA May Free Convict, HOUS.
273.
CHRON., Mar. 11, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Khanna & McVicker, Retests of DNA May Free
Convict].
Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349, at *2 (Tex. App.274.
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Sutton also
complained about the "damaging" questions his counsel asked of him on direct
examination regarding a prior misdemeanor weapons possession conviction and about his
having a sexually transmitted disease. Id.
Id. at *1-*2.
275.
Id. at *1-*3. The appellate court found, under the first prong of the standard
276.
derived from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in crediting trial counsel's testimony to a matter of trial strategy, and
thus trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Sutton, 2001 WL 40349, at *1-*3. The court also found, under
Strickland's second prong, that there was no showing of prejudice to Sutton. Id. at *2.
Even though Sutton's appellate attorney claimed that "independent DNA analysis in this
case is very important to the entire case and the only viable defense available to
defendant," the court faulted him for failing to produce "any evidence of independent DNA
analysis that would vindicate [Sutton] or raise questions about his innocence." Id. at *2.
See Thompson, Review of DNA Evidence, supra note 256, at 1.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.

280.

Id. at 1-2; see Khanna, DNA from Conviction of Teen Will Be Retested, supra
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the suspects in this case exceeded one in eight African American
males, rather than one in 694,000 as the crime lab technician
had testified.281
Not only did the forensic lab misstate the evidentiary weight
of the DNA finding, it also failed to present the DNA evidence
that would have excluded Sutton as one of the rapists.2 82 In sum,
the procedures employed by the crime lab "fell well below
accepted professional standards for quality scientific work."282
Specifically, the forensic work revealed multiple problems:
"inadequate
characterization
of
samples,
inadequate
documentation of findings, failure to run important experimental
controls (e.g., reagent or extraction blanks), failure to present
allele tables, inadequate review of conclusions, and incorrect and
misleading statistical computations."284 Contrary to scientific
protocols, but according to its normal practice, "the crime lab
used all of the swabs in the rape kit to make a DNA profile of the
285
rapist, [apparently] leaving the defense nothing to test."
However, independent investigators were able to locate a vaginal
smear from the victim containing a microscopic amount of DNA,
enough to allow a private lab to perform a new DNA test that
showed Sutton could not have been the rapist. 286 In January
2004, the DNA analyst whose erroneous findings formed the core
of the prosecution's case against Josiah Sutton was reinstated to
her job at the Houston crime lab after successfully "arguing that
any errors she made were the product of systemic problems at

note 260 ("The testimony strongly implied that this was a unique match, that Mr. Sutton
was the only person in the world that would have this DNA pattern, when really
thousands and thousands would." (quoting Dr. William C. Thompson)).
281.
See Thompson, Review ofDNA Evidence, supra note 256, at 2-3.
282.
See id. at 1-2 (detailing DNA evidence that "taken as a whole provides strong
evidence of Sutton's innocence").
283.
Id. at 2.
284. Id.
285.
Kimberly, HPDAppetite for Evidence Assailed, supra note 254.
286.
See Khanna & McVicker, Retests of DNA May Free Convict, supra note 273
(criticizing the crime lab's unnecessary use of all four vaginal swabs as against the
industry practice of conserving evidence). Houston examiners made three attempts "to
establish a 'standard type' for the victim's DNA, which allows analysts to separate fluids
from another person." Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, New DNA Test Casts Doubt on
Man's 1999 Rape Conviction, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.truthinjustice.org/sutton.htm. Routine DNA testing procedures normally
establish a victim's "standard type" on the first try. Id. Additionally, the crime lab
'misidentified the source of a semen stain found in the back seat of the victim's car."
Khanna & McVicker, Retests of DNA May Free Convict, supra note 273. "The lab
concluded the stain contained a combination of DNA from Sutton, the victim and the
second attacker," but in fact "neither Sutton nor the victim's DNA was present in that
sample." Id.
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287
the crime lab, not individual negligence." The lab itself remains
closed because of the Sutton scandal and resulting
investigation.2 88
In sum, Dr. Thompson concluded that the forensic testimony
in the Sutton case constituted "'outright misrepresentations of
scientific findings .... All of the errors seemed to conform to
289 Dr. Johnson's view of the forensic
police theory in the case.'
testimony was similar: "'There [were] horrendous technical errors
throughout the whole case, but even if you accept their
290 results,
is still-wrong.'
results
those
of
interpretation
their
then
Josiah Sutton, who was sixteen years old at the time he was
arrested, served four and one-half years of his twenty-five year
sentence before being released on bond in March 2003 pending
the prosecutor's decision on whether to oppose the vacation of the
2 1 In June 2003,
conviction and the dismissal of the charges.
Harris County District Attorney Chuck Rosenthal decided to join
292
the request that Josiah Sutton receive a pardon. Finally, on
May 14, 2004, Texas Governor Rick Perry pardoned Josiah
Sutton on the basis of innocence upon the unanimous
9
recommendation of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Governor Perry noted the trial court's finding of "'clear and
convincing evidence' that Sutton could not have committed the
2 94
rape for which he was convicted."
Nor is Josiah Sutton the only documented victim of forensic
malfeasance at the Houston crime lab. In October 2004, a

See Associated Press, Fired DNA Analyst in Embattled Lab Gets Job Back (Jan.
287.
28, 2004), available at http.J/abclocal.go.com/ktrk/news/012804-APlocal-dnalab.html.
Id. DNA from approximately 380 successfully prosecuted cases are currently
288.
being retested by the Houston Police Department and the Harris County District
HPD
Attorney's office. Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Independent Review Sought for
Sept. 2,
Lab: Chief Makes Call After the Discovery of More Case Files, Hous. CHRON.,
27 7 176 4
. In
2004, available at http://chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/special/crimelab/
known as
now
lab,
crime
the
of
2004, the HPD reopened the Serology/DNA department
the biology section, but only for "biological stain identification." Kristen Mack,
The
Accreditation for Crime Lab to Cost $1 Million, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2004, at A13.
national
earn
to
hopes
and
staff
its
of
competency
the
ensure
to
efforts
made
has
lab
the
accreditation from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Board before
end of the year. Id.
Madigan, supranote 213 (quoting Dr. William C. Thompson).
289.
Id. (quoting Dr. Elizabeth Johnson).
290.
See Roma Khanna, Taking Back the Life He Lost, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2003,
291.
at Al.
See Roma Khanna, DA Supports Move to PardonSutton, HOUS. CHRON., June
292.
28, 2003, at Al (reporting that the Harris County District Attorney joined defense
attorneys in urging the state governor to pardon Josiah Sutton).
See Roma Khanna, Perry Signs Pardon for Sutton: Man Convicted on Faulty
293.
DNA May Be Entitled to $100,000, HOUS. CHRON., 3 Star ed., May 15, 2004, at Al.
Id.
294.
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Houston judge ordered the release of George Rodriguez, who had
served 17 years upon a rape conviction largely predicated on
testimony from a crime lab supervisor.29 5 District Attorney
Rosenthal conceded that the forensic testimony leading to
Rodriguez's conviction was "scientifically unfounded and
inaccurate." 96 The crime lab disaster has led to calls to halt
executions of inmates from Harris County until the Houston
Police Department can examine nearly 300 boxes of evidence that
could be connected to death penalty cases.297 The crime lab's DNA
division has been closed since December 2002 while evidence
processed in hundreds of criminal convictions is retested.299
However, the retesting process has been disrupted by official
mishandling and mislabeling, leading the District Attorney's
Office to "consider[] criminal charges against analysts from the
Houston Police Department crime lab who may have falsified
2 99
information in an audit."
D. Crime Laboratories:The Overworked, the Underfunded, the
Prosecution-Oriented,and the Corrupt
The chaos at the Houston DNA laboratory may be notorious,
but it is far from the only DNA testing facility or other forensic
crime lab to come under intense criticism for its faulty
procedures and for yielding to the pressure to take shortcuts
because of large backlogs and funding shortages. °° In many DNA
295.
See Steve McVicker, DNA Sets Inmate Free After 17 Years: But Houstonian May
FaceNew Trail in 1987 Rape Case, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2004, at Al.
296.
See Roma Khanna, Freedom's Price May Be a New Trial: Prosecutors Look at
How to Make a Case Against George Rodriguez Despite DNA Error,HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
2,
2004, at Bl. The challenged testimony in the Rodriguez case came to light after a Houston
crime lab supervisor was found to have interpreted similar scientific evidence in opposite
ways in two rape cases, "offering testimony each time that bolstered the prosecution's
case." Roma Khanna, Two Rape Cases, Two Opinions on Similar Evidence: Supervisor's
Inconsistent Takes Raise Doubts about His Testimony, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2004,
at
Al (reporting that forensic experts and Rodriguez's lawyers suspect a "pattern
of
scientists from the Houston Police Department crime lab manipulating their findings
to
fit prosecutors' theories of various crimes").
297.
See R.G Ratcliffe & Roma Khanna, Governor Refuses to Halt Executions: Despite
Turmoil at Crime Lab, Perry Aide Says Present Reviews Sufficient, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 5,
2004, at Bl; Roma Khanna, Police Chief Calls for Halt of Executions Until Evidence
Confirmed, Houston Chronicle, at http://www.chron.comJcs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/
crimelab/2823255 (Sept. 30, 2004).
298.
See Steve McVicker & Roma Khana, Independent Review Sought for HPD Lab:
Chief Makes Call after the Discovery of More Case Files, Hous. CHRON., Sep. 2, 2004, at
Al.
299.
See Roma Khanna, HPD Errors Spark New Review of DNA Cases: DA
ConsideringChargesfor Some Crime Lab Analysts, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 28, 2004, at Al.
300.
See Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209
(stating that in addition to the problems experienced in Houston, crime labs in Oklahoma
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testing scenarios, "standards are often lax or nonexistent,
technicians are poorly trained, and defense lawyers often have no
money to hire their own experts.""' Moreover, incompetence and
a proprosecution bias often go hand-in-hand to distort laboratory
findings." 2 This Part of the Article provides an overview of
significant reliability and veracity issues in two state crime labs
and in one federal lab as illustrations of the endemic and
seemingly unavoidable problems in this area.

standards
City, Montana, and Washington State have also come under fire for their lax
its
and poorly trained technicians). The chaos in the Houston crime lab also extended to
be
to
lab
crime
the
of
division
second
the
became
toxicology section, which in October 2003
the second
for
suspended
was
and
test
competency
a
failed
supervisor
its
after
down
shut
on
time within a year. Roma Khanna, HPD's Toxicology Lab Shut Down: Division Testing
Star
Hold After Supervisor Fails Competency Exam, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 30, 2003, 3
Edition, at 1, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/crimelaht
may have
219095. Local lawyers and judges expressed their belief that thousands of cases
More
Holland,
Nancy
See
lab.
toxicology
the
in
failings
been adversely affected by the
Cases in Jeopardy Due to Troubled HPD Crime Lab, at http://www.khou.com/
(Oct. 30,
news/local/houstonmetro/stories/khou0031030-cc-hpdcrimelab.lba5aOO.html
of the work of
2003). As was true with the DNA section, official concerns about the quality
and
the toxicology lab, including complaints about chronic staff shortages, case backlogs,
prior to
inadequate sample preservation facilities, had been raised and ignored for months
Before HPD
the closing of the section. Associated Press, Report: Concerns Raised Months
Lab Unit Closed (Nov. 9, 2003), available at http://www.khou.com/news/localIstories/
suspended
khou03llO9-dsCrimeLab.3491c84f.html. The toxicology supervisor who was
for incompetency also managed the crime lab's narcotics division in addition to repairing
the
scientific instruments, compiling records to comply with discovery requests, acting as
& Roma
drug testing liaison, and serving as paymaster and timekeeper. Steve McVicker
Before
Khanna, Early Lab Warnings Arose: Staff Shortage Caused Concerns Months
Unit's Shutdown, HouS. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2003, 4 Star Edition, at 33.
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, supra note 209
301.
State); see
(reporting problems in DNA labs in Oklahoma City, Montana, and Washington
DNA
Missteps:
Lab
Avter
Look
2nd
Gets
Case
also Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna,
at
Work, Police Tactic in Question, HOUS. CHRON., May 4, 2003, at Al (reporting problems
FW
into
Inquiry
Widens
DA
Mosier,
Jeff
Texas);
crime labs in Dallas and San Antonio,
Crime Lab: Ex-Employees Bring Forward New Allegations About Testing Reliability,
office
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 28, 2004, at 3B (reporting district attorney's
Probe,
investigation into Fort Worth crime lab); John Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of
of
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 29, 2003, at A12 [hereinafter Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject
inquiry after
Probe] (reporting that "a police lab in Fort Worth, Texas, faces a criminal
a state
revelations that a senior forensic analyst ignored proper DNA procedures"; that
also face
crime lab worker in Orlando, Florida falsified DNA data; and that 'FBI officials
number of
questions about how to protect the bureau's DNA database from a growing
problems at local police crime labs").
See Axtman, supra note 144 ("My sense is that this is a much more widespread
302.
has been admitted .... There are incredible shortcuts that technicians have
than
problem
of pure
taken, sometimes out of laziness, sometimes out of zeal, and sometimes out
of
incompetence." (quoting Lawrence Goldman, president of the National Association
Bias
Pay:
Defendants
Falter,
Labs
When
al.,
et
Criminal Defense Lawyers)); Steve Mills
that
Toward ProsecutionCited in Illinois Cases, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, at C1 (reporting
"across the country, forensic science is being undermined by unproven theories and
experts who testify in a misleading fashion").
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In 1993, the West Virginia Supreme Court detailed the
"systematic practice" of Fred S. Zain, the former
director of West
Virginia's state crime lab's serology division, of engaging in fraud
and perjury over a number of years in reporting and testifying
about lab results."'
In addition to detailing Zain's
misconduct, 30 4 the report investigated the conditions and
procedures at the laboratory that had contributed to the
environment facilitating the criminal conduct and inhibiting its
detection." 5

303.
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div.,
438
S.E.2d 501, 502-03 (W. Va. 1993). The court described the extent of the fraud
in the crime
lab as "shocking and [as] represent[ing] egregious violations of the right of a
defendant to
a fair trial. They stain our judicial system and mock the ideal of justice under
law." Id. at
508. The case that prompted the inquiry involved the conviction of Glen Dale
Woodall of
multiple felonies, including two counts of sexual assault, which resulted in
a sentence of
203 to 335 years in prison. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 253 (W. Va. 1989).
Mr. Zain
testified at Woodall's trial that "the assailant's blood types... were identical
to Mr.
Woodall's," and that this combination of blood types could "occur in only 6
of every 10,000
males" in the state. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime
Lab., Serology
Div., 438 S.E.2d at 509 (alteration in original). "DNA testing ordered ...in
a subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding conclusively established that [Woodall] could
not have"
perpetrated the crime. Id. The report commissioned by the West Virginia
Supreme Court
(and attached as an exhibit to the court's opinion) cited at least 100 instances
in which
Zain would "record[] on his worksheet results from enzyme test
plates which
appeared.., to be blank." Id. at 502-03, 511. In those cases, Zain apparently
testified
that the lab findings were consistent with results of known samples from the
defendants
or the victims, thus inculpating the defendants. Id. at 512 & n.9. After Zain
left the crime
lab, some state prosecutors became dissatisfied with the work of the other
lab analysts
and "specifically requested that the evidence be analyzed by Zain," who thus
continued to
provide his services to the prosecutors. Id. at 512-13 n.16.
Zain also testified falsely in court regarding his academic credentials, specifically
fabricating his attainment of a "minor" in chemistry in connection with his
only degree, a
Bachelor of Science. Id. at 515 n.27. The report remarked on Zain's "less
than stellar"
academic record, observing that the head of the state serology division had
received an "F"
in organic chemistry the first time he took the course as an undergraduate,
improving to a
"D" upon retaking the course. Id.
304. In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology
Div., 438
S.E.2d at 503. The report commissioned by the West Virginia Supreme
Court detailed
"the acts of misconduct on the part of Zain":
(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic
matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency
of
genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items
had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting
inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records;
(7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic markers
had
been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results;
(9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported
only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible
or
improbable results.
Id.
305. Id. at 503-04.
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These "procedural deficiencies" included a familiar inventory
of inadequate laboratory practices:
(1) no written documentation of testing methodology; (2) no
written quality assurance program; (3) no written internal
or external auditing procedures; (4) no routine proficiency
testing of laboratory technicians; (5) no technical review of
work product; (6) no written documentation of instrument
maintenance and calibration; (7) no written testing
procedures manual; (8) failure to follow generally-accepted
scientific testing standards with respect to certain tests; (9)
inadequate record-keeping; and (10) failure to conduct
collateral testing. 6
The West Virginia Supreme Court made it clear that "this
corruption of our legal system would not have occurred had there
controls and procedures in the Serology
been adequate
307
,
Division.
In San Francisco, a 1994 sting operation uncovering the
"faking" of results by a city forensic analyst led to a grand jury
investigation, which concluded that conditions at the crime
laboratory were so reprehensible that they seriously jeopardized
0
the admissibility of DNA evidence in criminal trials." In 1999,
the San Francisco Crime Lab was again the subject of a judicial
inquiry, which found "disarray, especially at the administrative
level," and concluded that "little improvement has3 90 been
manifested" since the grand jury report five years earlier. The
superior court criticized Alan Keel, director of the San Francisco
crime lab, for his insufficient credentials, his disregard of
established protocols, his "degree of bias" against the defense,
analysis was so basic that it could
and his suggestion that DNA
31 °
barn.
a
in
be "performed

Id. at 504.
Id. at 508. The supervisor of the state Criminal Identification Bureau's serology
307.
Id. at
department testified that the state "'ran the laboratory on a shoestring budget."'
514-15 & n.26.
See Martin, supra note 206 (reporting grand jury findings on the crime
308.
in a Word:
laboratory of the San Francisco Police Department); Peter Eisler, Calif.'s Crisis
20, 1996,
Aug.
TODAY,
USA
Funding,
More
for
Campaign
Their
in
Case
to
Point
O.J.Labs
by
at 7A. The grand jury report found that the city's crime labs "cramped, hindered
obsolete
with
stocked
and
lighting,
and
equipment
safety
workbenches,
dilapidated
noted
equipment, some of it 30 years old." Martin, supra note 206. The 1996 report "also
'short
taking
for
1994
in
fired
was
who
lab,
crime
the..,
for
analyst
DNA
sole
that the
Id.
replaced.
been
not
had
cuts' during forensic procedures,"
See People v. Bokin, No. 168461, slip op. at 16 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 5, 1999),
309.
306.

available at http://www.scientific.org/distribution/archive/ca-v-bokin.pdf.
Id. at 14-15 & n.13.
310.
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Forensic laboratories at the FBI have also been tainted by
scandal in recent years.3 1' The U.S. Justice Department's
Inspector General opened an investigation in 2003 to examine
"the FBI lab unit that analyzes DNA in hundreds of cases a year
because a technician failed to follow proper procedure for two
years, " "' omitting "quality-control checks designed to keep
foreign material from contaminating lab samples." '
This
violation of testing protocols cast doubt on the accuracy of the
results. FBI lab officials have had to notify prosecutors, outside
labs, and others involved in the relevant cases, to allow them the
opportunity to retest and challenge the FBI's analysis and
conclusions." 4 The current Inspector General investigation is the
"broadest [official] review of the FBI lab since one concluded in
1997 that scientists in its explosive units engaged in bad science
and gave inaccurate testimony."' After that investigation, "the
FBI notified local prosecutors in 3,000 cases... that [FBI] agents
had misrepresented evidence, done sloppy work and sometimes
lied."1 6 In May 2004, the Department concluded that FBI analyst
Jacqueline Blake had committed "misconduct" in failing to follow
DNA testing protocols. 17 That same month, Blake pleaded guilty
311.
See generally KELLY & WEARNE, supra note 145.
312.
Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of Probe, supra note 301 (reporting that the
Inspector General's probe, along with "recent revelations of DNA irregularities in some
local crime labs that work with the [FBI]--could affect Attorney-General John Ashcrofts
project to create a national DNA database to help law enforcers identify crime suspects
through their genetic fingerprints").
313.
Richard Willing, Mueller Defends Crime Lab After Questionable DNA Tests,
USA TODAY, May 1, 2003, at A3; see also Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of Probe, supra
note 301 (reporting that the official investigation, originally limited to alleged wrongdoing
by a forensic technician, has expanded to look at the practices of the FBI lab unit that
analyzes DNA in hundreds of crime cases a year).
314.
See Lauren Ritchie, Bad Testimony, DNA Problems Demand Trial, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 2, 2003, at G1 (discussing a case in which an FBI agent gave potentially
false testimony that led to the murder conviction of a former police officer).
315.
Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of Probe, supra note 301; see also Ritchie,
supra note 314 (reporting that the inspector general concluded that a senior FBI agent
"testified falsely" in the high-profile case involving bribery allegations against U.S.
District Judge Alcee Hastings and noting that the inspector general's report singled out
thirteen FBI agents for issuing scientifically flawed reports in eighteen high-profile
proceedings).
316.
Ritchie, supra note 314; see also Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of Probe,
supra note 301 ("'All of us are depending on DNA as a gold standard in forensics workinnocence projects, prosecutors and defence lawyers. And now we don't have a gold
standard.'" (quoting "Frederic Whitehurst, a lawyer and former FBI lab employee whose
whistle-blower allegations led to major changes in the lab in the mid-1990s")).
317.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA
LABORATORY:

A REVIEW

OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES

130 (2004)

[hereinafter The FBI DNA Laboratory], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/
0405/final.pdf. "Blake's actions rendered all of her DNA analyses for which she failed to
complete the negative controls scientifically invalid." Id. at 2.
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to a criminal charge of making false statements regarding her
318
failure to follow piotocol in approximately 100 DNA analyses.
The Inspector General concluded that "Blake's misconduct, and
the Laboratory's failure to detect it for a period exceeding two
years, has damaged intangibly the credibility of the FBI
Laboratory.""'9
The FBI's metallurgy lab has been criticized for utilizing
flawed methodology in a National Research Council report that
cites "examples of inconsistent or contradictory testimony by FBI
experts in courtrooms." 20 The same FBI section has also had to
deal with revelations of false testimony by its forensic
technicians.32 ' In a recent case, an FBI specialist in lead bullet
analysis, who has now been indicted, admitted to committing
322 She
perjury during her expert testimony in a murder case.
claimed that her lying under oath occurred during a time when
23
she "'was stressed out by this case and work in general." Nor is
the scandal in the metallurgy lab limited to one incident of
perjury.2 4 According to the president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, "'The basic problem is that the FBI lab
employees are people who think of themselves as law enforcement
people as opposed to scientists."' 2 Throughout the country, crime
lab problems involving incompetent handling of forensic evidence,
inadequate testing procedures at crime labs, and false swearing by
analysts in connection with DNA evidence, are legion.328 A recent

Possley et al., supra note 10.
318.
The FBI DNA Laboratory, supra note 317, at iii.
319.
John Solomon, Scientific Panel Concludes FBI Bullet Analysis Is Flawed,
320.
Associated Press (Nov. 22, 2003), available at http://www.detnews.com/2003/nation/0311/
23/nation-331911.htm; see also generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS:
WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004).
See Associated Press, New Allegations Target 2 FBI Crime-Lab Scientists,
321.
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A15 (relating incidents of false testimony by FBI
scientist Kathy Lundy, who "knowingly gave false testimony in a 2002 pretrial hearing"
concerning her bullet analysis), availableat 2003 WL 3629264.
Id.
322.
Id. (quoting FBI analyst Kathleen Lundy).
323.
324. Id. (reporting that a retired FBI metallurgist had "gathered evidence that FBI
lab experts are stretching their conclusions beyond lab reports when they reach the
witness stand").
Dan Eggen, FBI Laboratory Moves to New Home: Quantico Facility Opens
325.
Today, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2003, at A21 (quoting Lawrence Goldman, president of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); see also KELLY & WEARNE, supra note
145, at 15-24 (describing the proprosecution bias of the FBI forensic laboratories).
See Possley et al., supra note 10 (reporting on recent crime-lab scandals in West
326.
Virginia, Oklahoma, Cleveland, Houston, Boston, Montana, Virginia, Arizona, California,
Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ft. Worth, and Washington); Timothy W. Maier,
Inside the DNA Labs, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, June 10, 2003, at 18, 18, available at 2003
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WL 8395967 (reviewing numerous forensic lab errors and false testimony by forensic
examiners).
A sampling of specific instances follows: Mills et al., supra note 302 (reporting on
prosecution bias in Illinois state police crime lab); Mark Gillispie & Lila J. Mills,
Suspended Crime-Lab Technician Lands a Job: Youngstown State Hires Him as Professor,
PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 2004, at Al (reporting on numerous allegations of incompetence
in the Cleveland crime lab, resulting in at least one exoneration of a defendant convicted
by false DNA Testimony); Ruth Teichroeb, Oversight of Crime-Lab Staff Has Often Been
Lax, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 23, 2004, at Al (reporting on on-the-job heroin
use and lying about test results by forensic analysts in the Washington State Patrol crime
labs); Eric Eckert & Ryan Slight, Crime-Lab Crisis Hurts Ozarks Drug Cases,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, June 2, 2004, at 1A (reporting on Missouri crime lab
technician suspected of stealing methamphetamine "from the samples he was in charge of
testing and using the drug while at work"); Lewis v. State, 451 S.E.2d 116, 117 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) (recounting the mislabeling of a DNA evidence locker); Becky Beaupre,
Backlogged Labs Put Justice on Hold, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1996, at 7A (describing the
attempted suicide of a man who had been incarcerated for a year for a rape he did not
commit, the delay attributed to DNA lab incompetence and backlog); Case Closed: Mich.
State Police Use DDC System to Solve Temp Problems (Direct Digital Control), AIR
CONDITIONING HEATING & REFRIGERATION NEWS, Aug. 30, 1993, at 20 (noting that in the
Michigan State Police Forensics Laboratory, twenty degree temperature swings every
fifteen minutes caused instruments such as a $100,000 scanning electron microscope to
rust and corrode); Tina Daunt, LAPD Blames Faulty Training in DNA Snafu Police:
Officials Say Evidence Was Destroyed in Rape Cases Because Detectives Didn't Know
About a Change in the Statute of Limitations, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at B3 (reporting
that "the Los Angeles Police Department mistakenly destroyed biological evidence in
1,100 sexual assault cases," with police officials blaming "the problem on their failure to
properly train detectives on maintaining so-called rape kits" and recounting that "the
district attorney's forensic science director complained that evidence in as many as 4,000
sexual assault cases in Los Angeles County might have been lost or destroyed by law
enforcement over the last six years"); id. ("Not only does [the destruction of the DNA
samples] impact thousands of women whose cases are unsolved, it also affects the
innocent people who may have been convicted of crimes but now will not be able to prove
their innocence." (quoting Karen Polmer, a Los Angeles sexual assault victim who helped
campaign for "lengtheningthe statute of limitations in rape cases")); Bill Dedman, DNA
Tests Are Freeing Scores of PrisonInmates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at A12 (describing
erroneous laboratory tests used to secure convictions, later reversed upon DNA testing);
id. ("Everyone who's ever been convicted on microscopic evidence ought to have their case
reopened." (quoting defense attorney Mark Barrett)); Editorial, Justice Delayed: Why Did
It Take So Long to Run DNA Tests, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 20, 2002, at B6 (describing
one-week jailing and subsequent two-year delay in administering DNA tests that absolved
two suspects of home break-in, in part because of "long backlog" at Sacramento crime lab);
Eisler, supra note 308 (reporting that the DNA lab in Kern County, California is a
refurbished dog kennel with such limited space that on one occasion evidence from a fatal
hit-and-run case was stored in a men's lavatory); Stephanie Hanes, Chemist Quit Crime
Lab Job After Hearing, Papers Show, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19, 2003, at 9B (reporting that a
former Baltimore County police chemist acknowledged that "she did not understand the
science of her forensic tests and that her blood work in a death-penalty case was
'worthless'"); Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Audits Turn Up Problems in DPS Labs:
Scientists Criticize Accreditation System, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2003, 2 Star Edition, at
Al (reporting on problems discovered in audits of regional labs of the Texas Department
of Public Safety, including "evidence improperly sealed and inadequately identified to
show who had handled it"; a "refrigerator half full of rape kits that was left at room
temperature for days, risking deterioration"; and a "supervisor who had not taken a
required statistics course, essential to interpreting and explaining DNA test results");
James Kimberly, Brown Has "Confidence" in Chiefs Lab Investigation, HOuS. CHRON.,
Mar. 27, 2003, at A35 (reporting on criticism of Houston crime lab for its ballistics testing
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Chicago Tribune examination of 200 DNA and death row
exoneration cases since 1986 "found that more than a quarter
involved faulty crime lab work or testimony."3 27 As forensic expert
and law and criminology professor William C. Thompson has
concluded, "The amazing thing is how many screw-ups they have
for a technique that they go into court and say is infallible." 28
Your attention now returns to your client's case. You consider
the difficulties inherent in forensic testing, not in terms of pure
science but as compounded by structural and human problems
involving an inundation of DNA samples for testing with
inadequate funds, equipment and underqualified analysts. You
ponder the proprosecution culture that infects so many of these
laboratories.And you think again about the merit of limitations
periods,seen now in light of the experience of DNA evidence frozen
in time, but perhaps locked in with incompetence and corruption.
IV. RETOOLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
FOR THE WORLD OF DNA

DNA has been called the new science of fingerprinting, which
produces infallible identifications.32 9 But DNA typing never renders

and noting that "in one case, a lab scientist admitted he fired a gun 25 times and used a
solvent to clean the barrel in order to match it to a bullet recovered from a murder victim"
and that "in another, the same scientist mistook a .22-caliber bullet for a .25-caliber
bullet"); Glenn Puit, Police Forensics: DNA Mix-Up Prompts Audit at Lab, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Apr. 19, 2002, at 1B (reporting on a review of "hundreds of DNA tests at the Las
Vegas police forensics lab following the discovery of a clerical error that placed an
innocent man in jail for nearly a year"), available at 2002 WL 6873850; Rene Stutzman,
Judge Rips FDLE Silence in Lab Flap: A Worker's Cheating on a Test Could Affect a
Seminole Murder Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 2002, at Al (reporting on judicial
criticism of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's cover-up of a "DNA labcheating scandal"); Del Quentin Wilber, Police Break DNA Machine with Overuse: Crime
Law Chief Says City Needs More than One, BALT. SUN, Apr. 18, 2002, at 3B (reporting
that the "Baltimore police were unable to run DNA tests on evidence for three weeks
recently after" overuse caused the lasers on the city's $80,000 genetic analyzer to burn
out).
Possley et al., supra note 10.
327.
Teichroeb, supra note 152 (quoting Professor William C. Thompson of the
328.
University of California-Irving).
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints,A.B.A. J., May 1988,
329.
at 66; Boyce Rensberger, FBI Chief Backs DNA "Fingerprinting":Sessions Issues Statement
FollowingScientists'Doubts on Accuracy, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1991, at A17 (describing the
support of FBI Director William S. Sessions for "DNA 'fingerprinting" and his description of
the process as a "vital tool" in criminal proceedings). There is some irony in the fact that
DNA was initially characterized as a type of fingerprinting in order to attribute to it the
latter technique's scientific status shortly before fingerprinting itself fell into a cauldron of
doubt concerning whether or not it applies a credible scientific methodology. See, e.g., Robert
Epstein, FingerprintsMeet DauberL The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" Is Revealed, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 605, 633-34 (2002) (enumerating cases in which fingerprint examiners made
mistakes in latent fingerprint investigation and relating the results of a 1995 proficiency
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a precise match."' No matter how overwhelming, DNA results are
always expressed in terms of probabilities, not certainties.33 ' The
myth that DNA analysis yields a positive identification has
significantly altered the adversarial culture of the criminal justice
system in sex offense cases.3 2 Many rape victims believe, thanks to
DNA, that the hunt for their attackers should now continue
forever, until the rapist is apprehended: "'I can't believe my case
will be closed when it's five years old ....I think it should always
be open, even after I die, until they find this person." "'
Prosecutors expect DNA crime labs to provide definitive results,
ensuring convictions. 334 The business of DNA typing markets itself
as a seller of certainty. 35 Defense lawyers do not often seek to have
supposedly incriminating DNA evidence retested because they,
"'like everyone else, have become so convinced of its infallibility
that they don't bother to challenge it."'336 Judges are so infatuated
with forensic fervor, the belief that DNA analysis never fails, that
they often refuse to authorize funds for an indigent defendant to
have the DNA evidence reanalyzed, even when the attorney
requests it.337 Innocent defendants are often intimidated into
examination in which only forty-four percent of the examiners tested "were able to both
correctly identify the five latent print impressions that should have been identified, and
correctly note the two elimination latent prints that were not to be identified").
330.
See Saks, supra note 82, at 1081 n.57 ("With the advent of DNA typing, ironically,
forensic identification science has begun to be recognized as a probabilistic and less than
completely certain endeavor.").
331. See id.
332.
See Chivers, supra note 142.
333.
See id. (quoting a rape victim referring to New York's five-year statute of
limitations). It is possible, however, that an open-ended prosecution period may not serve
therapeutic ends for the victim. Refer to Part IV.B infra (arguing that because the offender's
eventual capture is not guaranteed, prolonging the victim's day in court may prevent her
from ever reaching any sense of closure).
334.
Refer to text accompanying notes 138-45 supra (discussing the false assumptions
about the accuracy of DNA matching in light of the high rate of laboratory error); see also
DWYER ET AL., supra note 257, at 114 ("[Clriminal investigations can become echo chambers,
where answers are shaped by what people believe ought to be true rather than what they
know to be the facts.").
335.
See, e.g., Saks, supra note 82, at 1092 n.106 ("When there's no room for doubt. Let
Genetic Design Perform Your Forensic DNA Analysis and Put an End to Uncertainty."
(quoting an advertisement for a private DNA typing laboratory)).
336.
Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2 (quoting Dr. William
C. Thompson); see also Jonakait, supra note 157, at 168-69 & n.217 (explaining the
tendency of defense counsel to trust the reliability of forensic testing). The aura of scientific
infallibility can, of course, lead the unscrupulous to take advantage of the unaware. See
SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 274-81 (2001) (relating the 1992 discovery of an eight-year pattern of
fingerprint fabrication by New York state police officers). In their confessions, the troopers
acknowledged that, because fingerprinting was so thoroughly trusted, they chose to falsify
that type of evidence so their fraud would go unquestioned. Id.
337.
See Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2 (noting that
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33
pleading guilty by the myth of forensic certitude. "'Confronted by
false DNA evidence, many an accused would plea and go to prison
rather than take a chance of going before a jury and getting
34
by Certainty"? 1
slammed."' 3 9 Who, after all, wants to risk a 'Trial
Jurors are often in awe of a forensic expert whose
underpinnings remain a mystery but whose conclusions they
view as a "magic bullet"34 ' solving the crime: "After hearing
maybe an hour or two of testimony about how sophisticated and
accurate the testing process is, and all of the steps they've gone
through by the lab personnel, without really understanding the
concept of DNA, they understand the very simplistic notion that
'it's a match.'"34 2 The great success of the Innocence Project in
demonstrating how accurate DNA evidence can establish the
343 has,
innocence of many defendants erroneously convicted
ironically, enhanced the prestige of all DNA evidence used by

retesting a challenged DNA sample can cost between $2000 and $4000); see also COLE,
supra note 336, at 280 (stating that 'courts are reluctant to authorize the expenditure of
public funds for defense experts where other facets of the case indicate that the expenditure
may be a waste of time'" (quoting an unnamed New York special prosecutor)).
See In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
338.
S.E.2d 501, 506-07 (W. Va. 1993) (mandating procedure for setting aside guilty pleas
induced by false forensic testimony); Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence Is Foolproof, supra
note 2 (quoting Professor David Dow, director of the Texas Innocence Network, as saying,
"When we used to review a case, if there was a DNA test done and a scientist testified there
was a match, we wouldn't take the case. There are certain assumptions all the players
make. One is that when scientists in the crime lab test evidence, their testing is reliable.");
see also Roma Khanna & Dale Lezon, Brown Asks Hold on Some Death Penalty Cases;Also
Seeks Justice Department Aid to Review DNA Evidence from Police Lab, HOUS. CHRON.,
Mar. 15, 2003, at Al (reporting that in the wake of the troubles at the Houston crime lab,
Houston Mayor Lee Brown asked U.S. Attorney John Ashcroft for Justice Department's help
in reviewing all cases involving DNA evidence tested by the Houston crime lab).
Thom Marshall, Grand Jury Probe Right for Lab Mess, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 12,
339.
2003, at A21 (quoting T.W. Weston, chair of the Harris County Grand Jury Association).
See generally Renskers, supra note 6.
340.
McDonald, supra note 6, at 346-47 (explaining that DNA evidence became
341.
highly regarded in the judicial system because of its "dazzling potential of quick, clear and
unmistakable criminal identification"); see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[Slcientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury .... ).
McVicker & Khanna, Lab Chiefs Testimony in 3 Cases Questioned, supra note
342.
216 (quoting defense attorney Will Outlaw); see also Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 238
n.26 (Md. 1996) ("[Juries are no more capable of understanding probability statements
than they are of interpreting any other piece of highly technical information." (quoting
genetics scientist R. Lewontin, Letter, 372 NATuRE 398, 398 (1994))).
(last visited Nov. 12,
See http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/index.php
343.
2004). The Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law was created by
Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld in 1992. See Innocence Project, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). The "Project only handles
cases where postconviction DNA testing [of evidence] can yield conclusive proof of
innocence." Id. To date, the Innocence Project has documented 149 exonerations for
wrongly convicted defendants. Id.
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prosecutors to obtain convictions.34 The greater the showing of
DNA's capability to free the unjustly convicted, the more easily
jurors can be fooled by fabricated evidence, shoddy testing, and
perjury by DNA analysts.34 5 One of the jurors who voted to
convict Josiah Sutton on the basis of the erroneous DNA analysis
expressed his frustration after learning of the retesting that
exonerated Sutton: "I feel very badly that we got used. We were
led to believe that this was ironclad evidence and that the
3 46
credentials of the people from the crime lab were impeccable."
A. A Counsel of Restraint
In this age of DNA, it is difficult to argue against the core
sentiment that "lifting of the statute of limitations for violent
felonies will insure that violent rapists and sex offenders are
punished and the public is safer." 4 ' But such a statement
contains enough truth to be effectively misleading. Of course
more rapists would be arrested and prosecuted were there no
time limits on their cases.348 But society would pay a steep price
for these additional convictions in three important ways. First,
each person mistakenly incarcerated for rape represents one
actual rapist allowed to remain at liberty. Second, along with the
guilty, an unknowable number of innocent persons would be
swept into the DNA net and left without the means to combat
their microscopic accuser. Third, the judicial system is brought
into disrepute when it is allowed to function corruptly. If DNA
results were always correct and unerringly weeded the innocent

344.
See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Book Note, DNA's Dark Side, 110 YALE L.J.
163, 168 (2000) (commenting that "juries may come to overvalue DNA evidence to convict
defendants not indicted by other evidence" because of the widespread attention to the role
of DNA evidence in exonerations of the wrongfully convicted); Liptak, You Think DNA
Evidence Is Foolproof?, supra note 2 ("The exonerating power of DNA evidence reveals the
unreliability of other forms of incriminating evidence.").
345.
See Rapp, supra note 344, at 168 ("[W]hen juries place excessive faith in DNA,
they make it more likely that planted evidence, corrupt DNA labs, and lab error could
lead to unjust conviction."). Thus, while the "exonerating power of DNA evidence reveals
the unreliability of other forms of incriminating evidence," that same force saps the
potency of exculpatory evidence other than DNA itself. Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence
Is Foolproof?, supra note 2.
346.
Khanna & McVicker, Shoddy Lab Work May Free Convict, supra note 260.
347.
Knight, supra note 62, at 12.
348.
In New York State, county and state officials have commented that "removing
the statute of limitations on crimes like rape will allow prosecutors to solve crimes that in
the past would go unpunished" and that "there are a significant number [onl rapists who
could be prosecuted if the statute of limitation was suspended." Id. (quoting Erie County
District Attorney Frank Clark and State Assembly Republican Leader John J. Faso,
respectively, who both supported an initiative to lift the statute of limitations for sexual
assault crimes in New York).
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from the guilty, then New York City Police Commissioner
Howard Safir would be justified in asserting that "'there is
absolutely no legal or moral reason to have a statute of
limitations for these [rape cases with DNA evidence collected] "'9
But this logic is deeply flawed.
Initially, recall that the search for suspects typically ends
when a police crime lab establishes a DNA match, whether from
a suspect already specifically targeted or from a DNA database
sample.35 ° The police and prosecution mantra is simple: "'[If
you've got the DNA, you know it's the guy.""35 But when botched
DNA handling and testing has resulted in conviction of the
wrong individual as the sex offender, then unless the rape
allegation is a fantasy, the result of the prosecution is to allow
the actual rapist to remain at large, safe from accusation and
prosecution and free to rape other women. In the case of Josiah
Sutton, the Houston teenager who served four and one-half years
in prison for a sexual assault he did not commit, the man who
actually raped Priscilla Stewart likely spent those same four and
one-half years unscathed and unworried." 2
Second, the exhortation that DNA has made statutes of
limitations irrelevant, or worse, impediments to justice, ignores
both the possibility of forensic error and human corruption as
well as the profound difficulties of uncovering and rectifying
these untruths many years later.353 Consider a case in which the
DNA samples "were switched or cross-contaminated in the
laboratory or in the collecting and handling of the trace evidence
before it reached the laboratory."35 4 It might be possible to obtain
relevant testimony and documentation within a reasonable time
after the misfeasance. But "many years later, the police officers
and laboratory personnel involved could be [deceased or]
impossible to locate, and the written records" either destroyed or
unamenable to reconstruction.355 Intentional tampering is, of

Chivers, supra note 142 (quoting Police Commissioner Safir).
349.
See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 150, at 460 (observing that "investigations
350.
typically stop when police think they have the culprit").
Dennis Chaptman, Lift Time Limit for Rape Cases, Legislators Urge,
351.
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 1999, at 20 (quoting a government official).
Refer to text accompanying notes 256-94 supra (discussing the Josiah Sutton
352.
case).
See Axtman, supra note 144 ("We were all told years ago that DNA was
353.
infallible and we wouldn't have innocent people being convicted. Well, we forgot about
human error and misconduct.'" (quoting Texas State Representative Kevin Bailey, "who
chairs a legislative committee looking into the Houston crime lab" scandal)).
Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 473.
354.
Id.
355.
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course, extremely unlikely to be recorded. 56 Although retesting
may often be a reliable method for checking the accuracy of crime
lab analysis, it becomes a useless remedy under several
circumstances, including: when the original biological sample
was entirely consumed, either out of ignorance of protocols or for
a more malevolent reason, or when, because of accidentally or
intentionally improper preservation, the original sample has
degraded to the point where it is unusable. 5 7
Chain of custody issues illustrate another aspect of the
untenable dilemma facing an accused challenging long-ago
documentation. The general standard for admissibility of
evidence is that it must be "'in substantially the same condition
as when the crime was committed.'"3 5" A perfect chain of custody
is not a prerequisite to admission.35 9 Unless the defendant can
point to evidence that specifically raises the issue of tampering, a
presumption of regularity attaches to evidence that has been
kept in official custody at all times, and any gaps "in the chain of
custody... [go] to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility."36 The proponent's hurdle is quite low, demanding
only "reasonable probability that the evidence has not been
changed or altered." 6' "'Moreover, the integrity of such evidence
is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad
faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with." 62 The rule is well-nigh universal: Defects in the chain of
custody affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.36 3
356. See Diehl, supra note 7, at 437-38 (noting that the ability of an accused to
demonstrate field or laboratory error may well depend on the recollections of those who
handled the evidence and that the passage of time will make this task increasingly
difficult); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 67, at 473 (suggesting that although DNA
evidence may not be dispositive of guilt if the accused can contest the reported results of
the DNA tests, an evidentiary challenge to these results may not be viable years after the
events in question).
357.
Refer to notes 171-76, 226-29 supra and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of retesting and proper sample storage).
358. United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States
v. Aviles, 623 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1980)).
359. See United States v. Brown, 136 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling that
"lack of proof regarding a chain of custody does not render [the evidence] inadmissible");
United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that "the government
need not prove a perfect chain of custody for evidence to be admitted at trial").
360. See United States v. Rivera, 153 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Brown,
136 F.3d at 1182); Brown, 136 F.3d at 1182 ("Merely raising the possibility (however
hypothetical) of tampering is not sufficient to render evidence inadmissible.").
361.
United States v. Briley, 319 F.3d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 2003).
362. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 994 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1993)).
363. See, e.g., United States v. Vallie, 284 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding DNA
samples that were collected by the rape victim's sister admissible because "any defect in
the collection of the DNA evidence would have gone more to its weight than its

2004]

IN PRAISE OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

1267

These traditional chain of custody rules were not designed
with fungible and friable genetic evidence in mind, and they do
not suitably apply to criminal litigation that pivots on DNA
testing. Biological specimens such as semen or blood are not
distinguishable to the naked eye, so precise labeling and faithful
preservation of maintenance records assume a more critical role
than in cases dealing with less easily interchangeable evidence.
Although many controlled substances share the apparent
fungibility of minute biological evidence, several reasons suggests
that chain of custody concerns are often quite different. In more
serious drug cases, the quantity of narcotics is large and thus
easier to tag and retrieve from storage. Both the difficulty of the
forensic analysis and the risk of spoliation (with the attendant
impossibility for retesting) are far greater in sex offense cases
involving DNA than in most narcotics prosecutions. And
although the identity of the suspect is not involved in the forensic
analysis of controlled substances, the defendant's identity may be
the sole issue involved in DNA testing in a sex offense
prosecution.364 For these reasons, some courts and commentators
have called for raising the threshold for admissibility of biological
evidence.365
When experience has shown that a particular type of
important evidence may be problematic, the law's ordinary
response has been to emphasize the opportunity to adduce other
evidence in the case, both direct and circumstantial, to
366
corroborate or impeach the challenged proof. In this regard,
admissibility"); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 769 (9th Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., Sutton v. State, No. 14-99-00951-CR, 2001 WL 40349 (Tex. App.364.
Dist.] Jan. 18, 2001, no pet.) ("[Aippellant was convicted in large part on
[14th
Houston
the results of a DNA test based on serological evidence taken from the complainant
shortly after she was assaulted."); Khanna & McVicker, Shoddy Lab Work May Free
Convict, supra note 260 (interviewing a Sutton juror who stated that without the DNA
identification, he would not have voted to convict). On the other hand, cases in which the
defendant acknowledges having sex with the complainant but asserts that the act was
consensual turn not on whether defendant had intercourse with the victim, but rather
whether the victim consented. See, e.g., People v. Whitfield, 370 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975).
See, e.g., Lee v. State, 931 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Ark. 1996) (stating that blood
365.
samples are "interchangeable items" that "require a more conclusive chain of custody
than items of evidence which are subject to positive identification"); McDonald, supra note
6, at 357-58 (recommending "a more formidable [admissibility] standard [for DNA
evidence], such as 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or 'in all reasonable certainty")
For example, courts have uniformly recognized the unreliability of eyewitness
366.
testimony. In United States v. Wade, Justice Brennan pointed out that
the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or
witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with
innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially,
derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
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rape cases involving DNA analysis should be no different, and
evidence challenging a crime lab's conclusion should be
welcomed, whether the proof challenges the workings of the lab
or consists of extrinsic evidence such as proof of an alibi. Because
of the human tendency to shroud error and fraud in secrecy, the
value of competing evidence should be viewed as particularly
salutary.367 But many enthusiasts of this new forensic technique
hold that DNA renders immaterial the traditional methods of
attacking the identification of the defendant, such as
impeachment of the eyewitness or presentation of an alibi
through witnesses and corroborated by documentary evidence.36 8
Time's passage, along with the concomitant loss of evidence and
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 288 (1966); see also Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304,
337 (Fla. 2002) ("'[W]hile a great deal of credibility is given to eyewitness identification,
empirical studies have shown that eyewitness identification can actually be extremely
unreliable.... [Aipproximately fifty percent of those wrongly convicted were convicted
based on eyewitness identification evidence.'" (quoting Connie Mayer, Due Process
Challenges to Eyewitness IdentificationBased on PretrialPhotographicArrays, 13 PACE
L.
REV. 815, 819 (1994))). To cope with the dubious nature of eyewitness testimony, the law
has developed five ways to impeach a witness. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 501 (5th ed. 2004). Nonspecific methods
of
impeaching a witness include: (1) proving that the witness has some bias that would
cause him to fabricate his testimony, (2) showing a defect in his mental capacity, and
(3) showing that the witness is untruthful in nature. Id. Specific methods of impeachment
include: (4) showing prior inconsistent statements by the witness, and (5) rebutting
the
witness with contradictory testimony or other forms of evidence to. show that
his
testimony is simply wrong. Id.
367.
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprinting
Evidence and Expert Knowledge, 28 SoC. STUD. SCI. 687, 701 (1998) ("It is difficult
to
glean information about cases of error [in forensic science] because they rarely produce
a
public record, and the relevant organizations and agencies tend not to discuss them
publicly.").
368.
See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (County Ct. 1988).
DNA Fingerprinting... will revolutionize the administration of criminal justice.
Where applicable, it would reduce to insignificance the standard alibi defense. In
the area of eyewitness testimony, which has been claimed to be responsible for
more miscarriages of justice than any other type of evidence, again, where
applicable, DNA Fingerprinting would tend to reduce the importance of
eyewitness testimony.
Id. In a 1995 rape prosecution in New York, the court evaluated contradictory evidence
leading to a conviction. See People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1995), affd,
672 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 1998). When asked at trial to point out the rapist, the
complainant "identified a spectator in the courtroom as her assailant." Id. But forensic
testimony set out the probability of DNA from an individual other than the defendant
matching the crime scene DNA as one in 500 million. Id. at 632. The court held that the
jury was free to disregard the complainant's exculpatory identification of a courtroom
spectator because the DNA evidence was by itself sufficient to support the conviction.
Id.
at 633-34. The court acknowledged that DNA analysis was not infallible, but insisted that
"there can be little doubt ...that the perils of eyewitness identification testimony
far
exceed those presented by DNA expert testimony." Id. at 634.
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faded recollection, do not matter, because DNA never forgets and
never errs. In the words of a state legislator, "The statute of
limitations served a function, particularly in pre-DNA days, with
worries about memories fading. DNA doesn't rely on369memories.
you have DNA."
Those old arguments fade away when
Third, the legal system is mocked when false evidence is
allowed to triumph. The distinction between the theory of DNA
and how the reality of a crime scene sample is collected and
analyzed represents the difference between a reliable justice
system and one that perpetrates a fraud upon victims, the
accused, and the public. Once that proposition is accepted, then
time must matter. Time lapses may eradicate the only means for
a defendant to challenge the prosecution's DNA evidence and to
build his own case. Alibi witnesses may be dead or impossible to
locate; the defendant's own recollection will likely be dimmed;
and physical evidence, such as hotel bills, diaries, or ticket stubs,
will likely have disappeared. 7 ' Even if the defense is the consent
of the victim, the passage of time may critically damage the
371 Ultimately, because the
opportunity to effectively present it.
basis of any alibi defense is that the accused was not at the scene
of a memorable crime but rather minding his own unmemorable
business elsewhere, the more distant in time the event occurred,
the harder it will be for a defendant to reconstruct his location
and recall and summon witnesses who might verify his
whereabouts.
Precisely because DNA does not deteriorate if properly
preserved, the passage of time almost always weighs more
heavily against the defense than upon the prosecution. Courts
routinely uphold rape convictions based solely upon DNA
evidence even when the identity of the accused is not otherwise

Tanner, supra note 63 (quoting Michigan State Senator William Van
369.
Regenmorter, head of his state's Senate Judiciary Committee).
See Kim Koslowski, Rape Victim: Change Laws So Criminals Can't Elude
370.
Says DNA Testing Should Put an End to Statute of Limitations, detnews.com,
She
Arrest:
2 79
.htm (May 30, 2000) (stating
at http://www.detnews.com/2000/metro/0005/30/a06-65
what happened or remember
of
diary
a
keep
to
reason
no
"have
suspects
innocent
that
where they were on the day in question"); see also Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 994-96
("[Tihe statutes [of limitations] protect defendants from an unfair trial by militating
against prejudice caused by deterioration of evidence. This policy is premised, at least
partially, on the theory that evidence inherently degenerates with the passage of time."
(footnote omitted)).
See Bernasconi, supra note 4, at 999-1000 & n.131 (arguing that a defendant
371.
will find it more difficult to corroborate a legitimate consent defense with witnesses and
other evidence after many years); Diehl, supra note 7, at 438 ("A defendant's ability to
gather evidence, witnesses, and otherwise develop [a consent] defense generally will decay
as time elapses.").
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corroborated." 2 Thus, the opportunity to cross-examine the
complainant is of extremely limited value when the prosecution
of the case is unaffected, even if the victim recalls nothing
whatsoever about the defendant's identity. By the same token,
the prosecution's burden is reduced the later the trial occurs,
because the DNA evidence merely lies in storage and the forensic
testimony will most likely be based on laboratory notes, not
personal recollection.373 That prolonging the trial favors the
prosecution raises another criticism against ending or extending
the statute of limitations.7 4 What incentive does the State have
to pursue the assailant with dispatch if the case may be tried a
quarter-century hence as easily as or more easily than tomorrow?
B. Would Rape Victims Benefit from the Elimination of a
Limitations Period?
One of the core assumptions of the movement to eliminate
time limits for rape prosecutions is that such a measure reflects
the desire of victims. 3 But it is far from clear that extending the
possibility of a rape prosecution indefinitely is either generally
desired by rape victims or ultimately in their interest. 37 6 True,
372.
See, e.g., People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 847-48 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding
conviction when victim was unable to identify her assailant because he wore a mask
during the attack); People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 631-32, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1995)
(upholding conviction when complainant identified courtroom spectator as her rapist,
contradicting her previous lineup identification of the defendant); King v. State, 91
S.W.3d 375, 377, 383 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (upholding conviction of
defendant whose victim was blindfolded during attack and could make no identification);
Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 159-60 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. refd) (upholding
conviction when victim was unable to identify defendant because a blanket had been
placed over her head); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438, 448-49, 453 (Wyo. 1993)
(upholding conviction even though the complainant, unable to make an identification,
testified that the defendant "resembles him").
373.
See, e.g., Jenkins. v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 792-94 (Ind. 1993) (stating that "the
right to confrontation [of witnesses] is not absolute" and permitting the use of laboratory
notes under the business record hearsay exception where a laboratory supervisor testified
in lieu of the technician who actually performed the DNA analysis).
374.
See Diehl, supra note 7, at 433-38 (outlining the disadvantages to the defense
when the statute of limitations is prolonged or eliminated, including diminishment of the
defendant's ability to prove that the evidence was mishandled or that laboratory errors
occurred and noting that "with time, memories fade, evidence is misplaced, [and]
witnesses become harder to locate").
375.
See Chivers, supra note 142 (interviewing several rape victims who oppose time
limitations to the prosecution of their cases). See generally DANIEL W. SHUMAN &
ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES 101 (2000)
(noting that a commonly expressed belief is that prosecution of crimes-even old crimesis therapeutic for a victim, giving them a sense of relief and closure).
376.
See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
976-77 (1985) (noting that extending deadlines is not necessarily in the victim's interest
because of the possibility of the victim having to relive the event). A large and growing
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many victims of rape have campaigned for elimination of
limitations periods, vowing that rapists deserve never to be free
from prosecution for their heinous act."' But some advocates for
rape victims worry that prosecuting sexual assault cases years
later may force women who have put the past horror behind
them to relive their trauma once again. Prosecutors who seek
to revive a sexual assault accusation from many years earlier are
learning that many victims "have never told their current
3 79
partners or families of their experience." The criminal justice
coordinator for New York City's mayor observed that prosecuting
an old rape case means "asking the victim who may have closed
the
open
to
case
book on the
psychological
the
38 °
ask."
to
thing
a
painful
book .... Sometimes it's too
As a question of psychological and social policy, there is
insufficient research to determine whether the possibility of an
endlessly delayed prosecution will help the victim see herself as
strong in seeking retribution, or hurt the victim by never
38
allowing her to achieve closure. ' One study of long-delayed
in
number of scholars are questioning whether the increased focus on "just deserts"
SMITH,
&
SHUMAN
See
interests.
or
desires
victims'
with
accords
criminal prosecutions
prosecution
supra note 375, at 101-12 (suggesting that the relationship between crime
Deterring
Christopher,
L.
Russell
problematic);
highly
is
and victim recovery
(2002)
Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 924-52
at
supra,
Henderson,
means");
"mere
as
victims
crime
uses
(arguing that retributivism
and
964-65 ("Common assumptions about crime victims-that they are all 'outraged'
rights
want revenge and tougher law enforcement-underlie much of the current victim's
fail to
rhetoric. But in light of the existing psychological evidence, these assumptions
address the experience and real needs of past victims." (footnote omitted)); Deborah Kelly,
Victim Participationin the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS,
POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 173, 175 (Arthur J. Lurigio et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter
not driven by
VICTIMS OF CRIME] (suggesting that the increased victim participation was
'a newfound compassion for victims," but rather stemmed from an instrumental concern
of the legal institutions themselves); Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing
leading
the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 15 ("One of the
the
arguments for restorative justice is the abandonment of victims' interests by
of
Implications
Health
Mental
The
Wiebe,
P.
Richard
retribution.");
of
jurisprudence
THERAPEUTIC
IN
DEVELOPMENTS
KEY:
Crime Victims' Rights, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
victims'
JURISPRUDENCE 225 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) (noting that
desire for justice or vengeance "may interfere with recovery if left unresolved").
belief
Refer to note 333 supra and accompanying text (describing a rape victim's
377.
is
that because of DNA testing, rape cases should not be closed until the perpetrator
found).
See Francie Latour, Revisited Rapes, Reawakened Trauma: DNA Testing
378.
Worries Victims'Advocates, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2000, at B1.
Shaila K. Dewan, DNA as a Sex-Crime Solver: Good Tool, Not Whole Solution,
379.
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at B1
Id.
380.
is a
See SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 375, at 108-09, 111-12 (stating that there
381.
allowing
by
victims
for
therapeutic
is
crimes
lack of research into whether prosecuting old
them to confront the wrongdoer and affirm that they were wronged).
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prosecutions has concluded that
we do not know what happens to victims of crimes that
remain
unprosecuted
for
many
years
or
decades.... Although it would be comforting to think that a
courtroom confrontation of the assailant who committed an
unspeakable crime many years ago is likely to help heal an
open wound, we cannot be confident that this delayed
confrontation will not have the opposite effect and undo
whatever healing has occurred. There are questions here as
to whether permitting the prosecution of old crimes will
increase the likelihood that an essential element in a
victim's recovery occurs or whether permitting such
prosecution will encourage crime victims to remain frozen
at an early stage of their psychological recovery, awaiting a
prosecution that may never happen.8 2
Criminal victimization can cause profound and prolonged
psychological trauma. 383 Although rape victims often suffer
markedly,384 the consequences of victimization are quite variable:
"the severity of the crime does not necessarily predict the
severity of the symptoms." 85 The duration of the symptoms is
similarly
uncertain. 386
Rape
victims
may
experience
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for many years.387 But the
critical question, from the victim's perspective, is to ask what will
382. Id. at 103.
383. See Wiebe, supra note 376, at 215 (summarizing research results indicating
that
victimization may lead to "anxiety disorders, depression, drug and alcohol
abuse, fear,
flashbacks, lowered self-esteem, sexual dysfunction, somatic complaints, suicidal
ideation,
suspiciousness, and a sense of social isolation").
384.
See Patricia A. Resick, Victims of Sexual Assault, in VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra
note 376, at 69 (noting that rape has been deemed "the most traumatic adult crime,
short
of murder," and asserting that "nearly 20% of rape victims attempt suicide,
and 44%
contemplate suicide" in the aftermath of the rape).
385. Wiebe, supra note 376, at 216.
386. Id. Much of the research into the adjustment of rape victims has tracked
the
question over relatively short periods, for example, two weeks to eighteen
months
postcrime. See Resick, supra note 384, at 72-74.
387. See Resick, supra note 384, at 77 ("All of the studies [of psychological
reactions
to rape] have found that the bulk of improvement occurs within the first three
months
after the crime, but that many rape victims continue reporting problems
with fear,
anxiety, self-esteem, depression, sexual dysfunction, intrusion and avoidance
for years
after the event."); Wiebe, supra note 376, at 216 (citing a survey reporting
that "fiftyseven percent of rape victims in a community survey reported having suffered
PTSD
symptoms at some point in their lives, with 16% reporting current PTSD symptoms,
an
average of 17 years after the rape"). Eighty percent of rape victims report PTSD.
Resick,
supra note 384, at 76. The "essential feature" of PTSD "is the development
of
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor
involving
direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death
or serious
injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS PosttraumaticStress Disorder
§ 309.81
(4th ed. 1994).
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significantly reduce the symptoms and facilitate closure."' Some
evidence suggests that the continuation of PTSD may be due to
the inadequate coping strategies of some victims."' Far from
"blaming the victim," this last finding serves to validate victims'
autonomy by intimating that recovery is largely in their hands.
"Taking individual responsibility for the experience may help the
victim to find meaning, because responsibility, if defined as the
choosing or creating of one's experiences, is related to meaning
and autonomy in life.""' Effective victim recovery seems at least
a two-stage process: accepting the fact of injury and then
39
asserting authorship for one's recovery. ' One study succinctly
392
limned the point: "healing entails empowerment."
A criminal prosecution may provide a juristic ending to the
victim's violation. But depending on the vagaries of the criminal
justice system to provide psychological balm is to risk relying on
9
other actors for the resolution of one's own trauma. Further,
See Wiebe, supra note 376, at 215 (stating that "the proliferation of victim's
388.
rights has stemmed from the desire to ease victims psychological suffering").
Id. at 217.
389.
Symptoms may also endure because, left to themselves, crime victims may
select inefficacious techniques for recovery. Research focusing on victims' coping
strategies outside a therapeutic relationship found that some victims' methods,
such as changing phone numbers, staying at home, moving, not going out alone,
installing new locks, bolting locks more, owning or carrying a weapon, changing
jobs, and generally exercising more caution, failed to facilitate their recovery
significantly.... Without assistance, then, many crime victims will continue to
experience significant adverse psychological symptoms.
Id.
Henderson, supra note 376, at 961 (footnote omitted).
390.
See id. at 961-62.
391.
Assuming responsibility for a traumatic experience is a process requiring an
assertion or reassertion of control in one's life. Responsibility initially requires
an individual to accept that the criminal event occurred... [U]ntil a victim
acknowledges the actual experience as hers... alone-that she was
raped... the victim is virtually powerless to be free from the rapist.., or to
take responsibility for, and thereby reassert control over, the event and the
direction of her... life.
Id.
The findings of the 1997 Department of Justice report on victims' rights and
services are in accord:
With the help of strong social support and pre-existing lifetime coping
skills, the intensity of traumatic reactions is likely to decrease over time. But it
is not unusual for reactions to continue until individuals feel that their lives
have stabilized and that they have regained a sense of safety and security in
their world.
OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD:
VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 223 (1998) [hereinafter NEW
DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD].
SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 375, at 106.
392.
See Henderson, supra note 376, at 976 ("Victims are likely to want a
393.
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when rape victims defer their recovery while waiting, perhaps for
many years, for the arrest and prosecution of their victimizers,
they remain particularly vulnerable to any future wounding
events, including retraumatization in an emotional reprise of the
original rape.394 Enlisting aid from a support system will also be
more difficult years later rather than nearer the time of the
precipitating event.395
Moreover, no clear connection has been established between
the commencement of a prosecution and the easing of victims'
traumatic symptoms.3 96 The participation of victims in the
criminal justice process "has been regarded commonly as
stressful and disruptive to their recovery, especially among
victims of sexual assault."39 7 The legal system's effect on the
victim has been referred to as the "second injury" or "second
wound."398 Despite the increased respect for and involvement of
psychological 'resolution' of the matter, but this kind of resolution does not ultimately
depend on the outcome of the criminal case."). In 1982, the President's Task Force
on
Victims of Crime asserted that victims' "healing process cannot truly begin until the case
can be put behind them." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REPORT
75 (1982). Professor Henderson has criticized this statement as "not supported by existing
psychological evidence: The healing process begins immediately after a traumatic
experience .... " Henderson, supra note 376, at 976 n.194. Over fifteen years after
the
President's Task Force report, a Department of Justice follow-up report manifested
a
more nuanced understanding of the issue. See NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD, supra
note 391, at 21 (recommending that all crime victims be afforded the right to extensive
services and support to assist in their physical, psychological, and practical recovery
from
the effects of crime "whether or not they report the crime or become involved in related
criminal prosecutions").
394.
See NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD, supra note 391, at 223 ("Crisis reactions
can also reappear at later times in [victims'] lives when another event triggers
their
memory of the original trauma."); Resick, supra note 384, at 82 ("Postponing recovery
from the rape trauma complicates recovery from later traumas because it appears that
when the first event was not resolved and processed to the point where the emotions
had
dissipated, it is left encoded with all the intense emotions intact.").
395.
See Resick, supra note 384, at 82 ("Family and friends are likely to be confused
as to why the victim is so upset years after an event occurred.").
396.
Weibe, supra note 376, at 224.
397.
Arthur J. Lurigio & Patricia A. Resick, Healing the Psychological Wounds of
CriminalVictimization: PredictingPostcrimeDistress and Recovery, in VICTIMS OF CRIME,
supra note 376, at 60. For example, in a recent case in which an accused rapist
was
arrested thirteen years after the crime, both the victim and accused now face trial,
and
the sex abuse detective who oversaw the original investigation has expressed his belief
that "there is no victory in this .... I don't think there's closure. I think it's reopened
closed wounds." Tom Spalding, DNA Test Links Inmate to Rape of Girl in 1991: Database
Invented After the Crime Led an IPD Detective to a Kidnapper in Missouri, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Feb. 12, 2004, at 5B.
398.
Martin Symonds, The "Second Injury" to Victims, EVALUATION AND CHANGE:
SERVICES FOR SURVIVORS, 1980, at 36, 36-38. "[E]xtended court proceedings may inflict
continual demands on [female victims of sexual assault] and keep them in a victim
role."
Lurigio & Resick, supra note 397, at 60-61. The prospect of providing courtroom
testimony has been viewed by crime victims as "one of most fear-provoking stimuli." Id.
at
61. Indeed, a rape victim's testimony may be far from cathartic. See Henderson, supra

2004]

IN PRAISE OF STATUTES OFLIMITATIONS

1275

crime victims in the legal system in recent years, the decision to
bring a case to trial, as well as the myriad choices regarding
scheduling, plea bargaining, and what evidence to adduce,
9 No
remain almost exclusively in the prosecutor's domain.
matter how the case unfolds, a critical component of a rape trial
4 0°
will be the victim's retelling of the story of her victimization.
Whether reimmersion into the past trauma is therapeutic or the
opposite almost surely hinges on the rape victim's highly
personal reaction.40 ' In fact, the unpredictable consequence of the
long-delayed prosecution may itself frustrate the process of
victim recovery. 4° Four outcomes are possible: a guilty defendant
may be convicted or acquitted, and the same options face an
innocent defendant. The alternatives for the recovery and
personal reintegration for a victim who has waited for many
years for a rape trial may be painfully uncertain. 43 There is, in
conviction or harsh punishment with
short, "no research linking
04
recovery.'
the victim's

note 376, at 980 ("Catharsis encompasses articulation and expression of traumatic
experiences in appropriate settings.... The victim is unlikely to feel that a courtroom is
the right place for this kind of emotional experience."). More broadly, the 1997 report by
the U.S. Department of Justice attributes victims' "second wound" to the "lack of support
and even stigmatization by friends, family, and social institutions ....[Victims] often feel
revictimized by the criminal or juvenile justice process, which traditionally has been more
concerned with the rights of the accused than with those of the victim." NEW DIRECTIONS
FROM THE FIELD, supranote 391, at 219.
See generally NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD, supra note 391, at ix-x
399.
(reporting on the "progress over the past two decades toward establishing state and
federal rights for victims of crime," but advising that "even in states that have enacted
constitutional rights for victims, implementation is often arbitrary and based on the
individual practices and preferences of criminal justice officials"); Robert C. Davis &
Madeline Henley, Victim Service Programs,in VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 376, at 15771 (describing the evolution of such programs).
See SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 375, at 107-08 (discussing the effect of
400.
judicial testimony on survivors and questioning its therapeutic potential).
See id. at 108 (stating that although some crime victims need a successful
401.
prosecution to move into recovery, others prefer to move on past the trauma if the
prosecution is not timely).
See id. (stating that some victims who have recovered can be debilitated by the
402.
renewed and delayed prosecution).
See id. at 105 (noting that it is unclear how victims respond to acquittals versus
403.
convictions of their assailants).
Id. The emotional crazy-quilt is readily apparent:
404.
Some crime victims appear to recover only after successful criminal prosecution,
and some appear to recover in the absence of successful prosecution or do not
appear to recover even after successful prosecution. Some crime victims do not
appear to recover until a delayed prosecution of an old crime, whereas some who
had appeared to recover seemed debilitated by the delayed prosecution.
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 109 (suggesting that for sexual assault
victims whose principal fear is revictimization by the same offender, even a delayed
prosecution may be more therapeutic than none at all).
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Nor does the fact that a prosecution has finally commenced
necessarily foster recovery for a victim anticipating a legal
conclusion to the case. Although the interplay of psychological
and legal factors is a priori unknowable in individual cases, it
may be stated with certitude that victims who believe they will
achieve closure only with the end of the defendant's appeals may
have many years to wait. And the occasional reversal of a rape
conviction and remand for another trial cannot be anything but
savagely harmful to victims' efforts to move on with their lives,
especially if they had sought affirmation of their recovery from
the legal system.4 °5
We can promise that rape cases will remain open. But
because we cannot guarantee that the offenders will ever be
caught, we may be forcing victims to prolong their day in court
forever. From a therapeutic justice perspective, the case for
eliminating limitations periods in sex offense cases is yet
unproven.
C. A BriefProposalfor Reform of the Statutes of Limitations in
Sexual Offense Cases
As noted above, prior to the recent DNA revolution, federal
and state legislation generally fixed the limitations period for
felonies at approximately five or six years.0 6 This Article has
argued that the traditional rationales for statutes of limitations
continue to supply persuasive evidence for caution before shifting
the balance between the state and the individual. Especially in
the age of DNA, the risk of an erroneous verdict is great and is
generally related to the endemic human factors of evidentiary
mismanagement and mendacious witnesses. Accordingly, the five
or six year limitations period warrants retention.
However, some consideration seems appropriate in light of
the difficulty of reducing the current backlog of DNA samples in
state and federal crime laboratories. An extension of the
limitations period, governed by a due diligence standard, might
accommodate the equities in this area. New York has such a
405.
See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983) (i[The Court of
Appeals failed... to give appropriate-if, indeed, any-weight to these relevant interests.
It did not consider the trauma the victims of these particularly heinous crimes would
experience in a new trial, forcing them to relive harrowing experiences now long
past.. . ."); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (criticizing the failure of the
lower court to consider the impact of yet another retrial upon the victim's "ordeal of
reliving such an experience for the third time").
406.
Refer to text accompanying notes 53-56 supra (comparing and contrasting the
statute of limitations approaches of states, the federal government, and the Model Penal
Code).
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provision, which excludes from the calculation of the statute of
limitation any period when "the whereabouts of the defendant
were continuously unknown and continuously unascertainable by
the exercise of reasonable diligence.' 0 7 This provision has been
interpreted to toll the statute of limitations for any time during
which either the whereabouts or the identity of the defendant is
unknown, as long as the police exercise due diligence in
establishing the above. 40 ' This provision has been applied to cases
in which the identify of a sex offender is unknown until
40 9
discovered though due diligence by the state. But the statute
also provides that "in no event shall the period of limitation be
extended by more than five years beyond the period otherwise
applicable."4 10 New York's limitations period for noncapital
felonies is five years;41' with the due diligence extension, a sexual
offense case could be prosecuted up to ten years from the date of
the offense. 2 Ascertaining the perfect balance among the
extraordinarily public policy concerns in sexual offense cases is
an impossible task. But the goal should be to allow prosecutions

407.
408.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (4)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1996).

The police may be ignorant of the whereabouts of a perpetrator of a crime where
they have identified the perpetrator but lack knowledge of his or her physical
location, or where they have not identified the perpetrator at all and thus cannot
determine where he or she is. The phrase 'whereabouts of the defendant' must be
deemed to include both situations.
The People may benefit from the toll for only those periods during
which the defendant's whereabouts remained unknown and were
unascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999). Other states have similar provisions.
See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 524 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
prosecution for escape was barred by the statute of limitations when the State failed to
adduce evidence that it had made a diligent effort to locate defendant).
409. See People v. Jones, 751 N.Y.S.2d 173, 174-75 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming the
tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section
30.10(4)(a) "because the record sufficiently establishes that defendant's identity and
whereabouts were unknown and unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
[and] [tihe People made a suitable showing of their extensive and diligent efforts to
identify the perpetrator of this series of sex crimes" (citation omitted)). In sexual offense
prosecutions based on DNA database matching, assessing the State's due diligence would
include considering the timeliness and thoroughness of its search of DNA databases for a
match to a rape kit DNA sample. See, e.g., People v. Sawyer, No. 50605U, slip op. at 7-9
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2003) (noting that during the six-and-a-half year search for the
perpetrator of a rape crime, DNA profiling and fingerprint analysis was routinely
performed and thus met the requirement of due diligence, tolling the statute of

limitations).
410. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(4)(a) (McKinney 1996); see Seda, 712 N.E.2d at
685 (noting that "the limitations period will be extended at most for five years").
411. § 30.10(2).
412. § 30.10(2)(b), (4)(a).
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in a timely manner, which would minimize the risk of erroneous
convictions.4 13 Allowing sexual offense cases to proceed up to a
414
decade after the offense may push the balance to its limit.
Another component of the diligent prosecution required of
the state relates to DNA laboratory accreditation requirements
and minimum evidentiary standards. Given the disastrous track
record of unaccredited crime labs,415 all states and the federal
government should require that all DNA samples be processed
exclusively in nationally accredited laboratories, whose
certification procedures, employee training and evaluation
records, and laboratory error rates are made public."' This
proposal would thus allow the prosecution to take advantage of
an extension of the original limitations period only if, in addition
413.
See Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 685 (stating that in enacting section 30.10 (4)(a), the
New York Legislature "carefully balanced the general policy in favor of avoiding
prosecution of stale cases against the countervailing policy of ensuring that law
enforcement officers have sufficient time to bring suspected criminals to justice," but only
in the event that due diligence was used).
414.
Federal legislation pending as of this writing contains a different tolling
proposal. See Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003, S. 1828, 108th
Cong. § 104(a) (2003).
In a case in which DNA testing implicates a person in the commission of a
felony, no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of the
offense shall preclude such prosecution until a period of time following the
implication of the person by DNA testing has elapsed that is equal to the
otherwise applicable limitation period.
Id. Unfortunately, this proposed legislation contains no ultimate endpoint for the
limitations period. See id. (imposing no maximum number of years). Consistent with the
reasoning in this Article, an appropriate provision might be added requiring, for instance,
that in no event may the prosecution commence any later than the expiration of twice the
length of the original limitations period. See § 30.10(3)(e), (4)(a) (limiting the prosecution
of a sexual assault to no more than five years beyond the original five-year period
following the assault).
415.
Refer to Part III.D supra (detailing the numerous problems at the Houston,
West Virginia, San Francisco, and FBI crime labs).
416.
See, e.g., DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA
Testing Laboratories, available at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/dabqas.htm
(last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (detailing standards for, inter alia, a quality assurance
program, laboratory organization and management, forensic examiner certification, an
"evidence control system to ensure the integrity of physical evidence," DNA sample
quality validation, forensic analytical procedures, equipment calibration and
maintenance, "procedures for taking and maintaining case notes to support the
conclusions drawn in laboratory reports," administrative and technical reviews,
proficiency testing, corrective action, audits, and environmental health and safety
programs). Many of the problems discussed in this Article would be alleviated if the crime
labs were accredited, their analysts certified, and adherence to professional standards
enforced. Interview with Dennis Reeder, coauthor of DNA Advisory Board Quality
Assurance Standardsfor Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories and Senior Manager, New
Product Development, Applied Genetic Analysis Group, Applied Biosystems (July 31,
2003) (on file with Author). The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 provided
for voluntary "quality assurance standards for DNA laboratories." 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(d)(2) (2000).
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to satisfying the ordinary measures of due diligence, the DNA
identification relied upon by the prosecution had been processed
by an appropriately accredited laboratory. Furthermore, an
evidentiary standard is needed to provide the defense an
opportunity to retest DNA evidence offered by the prosecution as
proof of the defendant's identity.4 17 The admissibility of any such
DNA evidence offered by the State should be conditioned upon
the preservation of enough DNA sample to allow for an
independent reanalysis by the defense.418
As you continue to prepare for the rape trial of your client,
you worry that whatever defense your client might have had has
long ago disappeared.Did the police act properly in collecting the
crime scene DNA sample? Did the state crime lab, which failed to
save a portion of the sample for retesting, follow properprotocols
and accurately analyze the DNA? Did your client have witnesses
and documentary evidence that confirmed his location in another
city at the time of the rape? Can you effectively cross-examine the
complainant, who has admitted that she cannot identify your
client? You conclude that, after twenty years, these questions
cannot be answered.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that the "advent of DNA analysis has
"
revolutionized both research science and the judicial system. '
But perhaps the revolution has gone too far. To maintain the
proper balance between a fair opportunity to prosecute crime and
an equitable prospect of defending against an accusation, the
venerable wisdom of our legal system that generally sets an
endpoint to a potential prosecution must be preserved. DNA
changes much about the world, but the disequilibrium caused by
eliminating limitations periods in sex offense cases will cause
untold harm by facilitating conviction of the innocent, by
allowing the State to cease active criminal investigations too
early, and perhaps even by endlessly prolonging the trauma for
rape victims.

Refer to text accompanying notes 171-76 supra (describing the importance of
417.
retesting forensic samples).
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1(c. 1) (2002) (requiring that "a sufficient portion
418.
of the physical evidence tested for DNA [must be] preserved and available for testing by
the accused"); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 152(C)(2)(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004)
(requiring that "physical evidence [be] collected and preserved that is capable of being
tested to obtain a profile from deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)").
Sue Rosenthal, My Brother'sKeeper: A Challenge to the Probative Value of DNA
419.
Fingerprinting,23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 195, 196 (1995).
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In 1540, the English Parliament enacted a limiting statute
that was clearly intended to "guard against the dangers of trying
a case for which the relevant evidence had been lost or
destroyed." 411 Over two and one-half centuries later, Chief Justice
John Marshall recognized that a claim that could be "brought at
any distance of time ...would be utterly repugnant to the genius
of our laws.', 2' The wisdom of the common law may still be
accommodated to the DNA revolution. Retaining (or
reinstituting) reasonable statutes of limitations is still the best
way to ensure that trials are conducted with as much relevant
evidence as is humanly possible. Limitations periods should
neither be revered nor reviled, but acknowledged as necessary
lineaments to our legal system's effort to secure accurate
outcomes.

420.
Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the
Doctrine of Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917, 925 ("Forasmuch as the time of Limitation
appointed for suing... extend, and be of so far and long time past, that it is above the
remembrance of any living man, truly to try and know the perfect certainty of such
things ...to the great danger of mens consciences...." (second alteration in original)
(citing the Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.))).
421.
Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).

